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The Navy Stock Fund (NSF) is a working capital fund used to purchase
and hold designated inventories of supply items at various stock points
until needed by a customer. The fund is currently comprised of ten
separate Budget Projects with total collections and expenditures
projected to be in excess of $ 1 8 bi 1 1 ion for Fiscal Year 1 986.
The authors examined the background and current operation of the NSF
with emphasis on identifying areas which would enable better cash
management within the NSF and thereby improve the overall cash position
of the U.S. Treasury.
Six areas not presently included in specific Federal cash management
programs were identified which offer potential NSF cash management
improvements. Ten specific cash management recommendations are
provided which would assist in minimizing the amount of NSF cash held
outside the Treasury Cash Account.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL INFORMATION
Effective cash management is a subject which has received ever
increasing attention in both the private and public sectors during the past
twenty years. What exactly is it? An Office of Management and Budget
report in October 1980 defined cash management as "getting the most out
of the time value of money we collect, hold and disburse" [Ref. I: p. 27].
Another definition states that cash management is the acceleration of
receipts (expeditious billing, collecting, and depositing of receipts),
timely disbursements (payments not early or late), and the investment of
any excess cash balances [Ref. 2: p. 29].
In the sixties, the private sector recognized the significance of the
time value of money and took appropriate steps to optimize it through
improved cash management techniques. During the last ten years, the
Federal government has made a concerted effort to incorporate these now
standard private sector cash management procedures into the handling of
its S 1 trillion annual cash flow [Ref. 3: p. 34]. Cash management
initiatives instituted through Department of the Treasury, General
Accounting Office (GAO) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
directives have had a major impact on public sector cash management
policy and procedures within all federal agencies. Still, there are
numerous opportunities left for improvement, and it is up to today's
financial managers to accept the challenge of discovering and
implementing them.
B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
Recent efforts toward optimizing the levels of Federal Government
cash balances have yielded various regulations and policies directed at
minimizing the cash which is held outside the Treasury Department cash
account, thereby minimizing the need for additional Federal debt. This
thesis will deal with one area of the Department of the Navy's financial
operations which impacts the Treasury account - the Navy Stock Fund
(NSF). Primary emphasis will be on the cash management posture of the
fund. This financial entity was selected for review based upon the
magnitude of its financial transactions. In Fiscal Year 1984(FY84) the
through-put of the NSF (total collections plus expenditures) was in
excess of $13 billion and in FY85 it was greater than $15 billion.
Projections for FY86 and FY87 exceed $ 1 8 bi 1 1 ion and $2 1 bi 1 1 ion
respectively. The NSF is the largest of all the Department of Defense
Stock Funds. FY86 estimates of the NSF Corpus (total inventory and cash
balance) exceed $19 billion. [Ref. 4: pp. 8, 11]
The objective of this thesis is to identify areas of potential cash
management improvement for the Navy Stock Fund. Current NSF cash
management practices with regard to billings, collections, deposits,
disbursements, and forecasting will be reviewed and the NSF itself will




Research for this thesis was accomplished in five phases:
1 ) literature search; 2) interviews at N5F higher commands;
3) compilation of data and research; 4) interviews at West Coast N5F
activities; and 5) consolidation of findings.
During phase one available literature from the following data bases
was reviewed:
1. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), U. S.
Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia.
2. Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and Defense
Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron
Station, Alexandria, Virginia.
3. The Naval Postgraduate School thesis, technical reports, and
general library collections, Monterey, California.
In addition to the above, reviews of pertinent Federal government cash
management programs and policies and of current NSF directives and
regulations were also conducted.
Phase two interviews dealing with cash management and general NSF
operations were conducted with Stock Fund managers and analysts in
Washington, D. C; Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Interviews were conducted at the following NSF higher
commands:
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
Naval Supply Systems Command, Washington, D. C.
Navy Accounting and Finance Center, Washington, D. C.
Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
Fleet Material Support Office, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Phase three consisted of a detailed review of the information
collected during the literature search and the higher command interviews.
This review highlighted areas requiring further data collection and helped
to focus attention on pertinent issues to be clarified during the next set
of interviews.
Interviews during phase four were conducted with NSF managers and
analysts at West Coast NSF stock points to evaluate cash management
practices at that level and to become familiar with the working
relationships of these activities with their respective higher NSF
commands. Interviews were conducted at these locations:
Naval Supply Center, San Diego, California
Naval Supply Center Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington
Phase five consisted of a consolidation of all findings and a listing of
the potential cash management improvements within the NSF discovered
during all previous phases of research.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The first chapter of this thesis is an introduction to the topic of Cash
Management Improvement in the Navy Stock Fund. It describes the
scope and objective of the thesis and details the research methodology
used to complete the thesis.
Chapter two provides background information which details cash
management development within the public sector. The chapter discusses
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cash management regulations development at the Federal, Department of
Defense (DOD), and Department of the Navy (DON) levels.
Chapter three provides additional background information and describes
how the Navy Stock Fund actually operates. The areas addressed include:
1 ) History of the Navy Stock Fund; 2) NSF basic operations; 3) N5F
procurement financing; 4) NSF supply system operations; 5) NSF relations
with other stock funds; 6) NSF organizational structure; 7) NSF stock
point inventory structure; 8) NSF accounting procedures; and 9) Recent
NSF developments.
Chapter four details the current cash management practices in place
within the NSF. The fundamental cash management areas of billings,
collections, disbursements and deposits are examined in an attempt to
identify potential cash management improvements. NSF forecasting,
pricing and budgeting procedures are additionally reviewed and the models
used by NAVSUP and NAVCOMPT to forecast NSF end-of-period cash
position for budget submission are compared.
Chapter five outlines areas for potential NSF cash management
improvements which were noted during the research phases. Six areas are
discussed: 1 ) Flexible Standard Pricing; 2) Forecasting; 3) Accounting;
4) Automated Data Processing; 5) Incentives; and 6) Human Factors.
Chapter six includes a summary of the study findings and the authors'
conclusions and recommendations.
15
II. CASH MANAGEMENT IN THF PUBLIC SFCTOR
A. BACKGROUND
Cash management should be viewed as a fundamental activity of an
organization's financial management function. Financial management
deals with the efficient utilization of organizational resources to support
objectives, and cash is one of the most important of these resources
[Ref. 5: p. 58]. It is also the most difficult resource to control. Without
cash an organization cannot operate.
The Department of Treasury serves as the treasurer for the United
States government and is responsible for government-wide cash
management policy and procedures. Serving in this capacity, the Treasury
recognizes that the payoff that results from deriving the maximum
benefit of cash resources (effective cash management) is an increased
availability of funds, which directly impacts the amount of Federal
borrowing to finance deficits or liquidity shortages [Ref. 6: p. 3]. It is
the Treasury Department that bears the service cost of the Federal debt
[Ref. 6: p. 273.
Treasury's interest in the topic of cash management has not always
been shared by all agencies of the Federal government. Until fairly
recently, development of cash management practices and techniques has
been primarily a private sector phenomenon. The major consideration
motivating private sector entities toward more effective cash
management has been the opportunity for increased profits, a factor
which is lacking within the public sector [Ref . 6: p. 2]. Federal agencies
16
have not always recognized the Importance of the time value of the money
they collect, hold, and disburse. During the decade of the 1970's, an
interest in the subject of cash management at department and agency
levels evolved within the Federal government. Rising interest rates,
increasing budget deficits, and a fluctuating economic environment had
significantly increased the opportunity cost of money and dictated that
improved cash management practices be developed for managing the
Federal government's $1 trillion annual cash flow [Ref. 6: p. 291.
B. CASH MANAGEMENT AT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL
Prior to the 1970's, a Federal government cash management policy
and regulatory framework did not exist. The government did not have
what could be described as a comprehensive cash management program
[Ref. 3: p. 35]. In 1971, the Department of the Treasury established the
Division of Banking and Cash Management. The mission of this division
included the issuance of policy guidelines and procedural instructions for
Federal agencies in managing cash. This was a renewed Treasury effort
to share its interest in cash management with all the other Federal
agencies. It was the first of many Federal cash management initiatives
which have been undertaken during the last fifteen years, up to and
including President Reagan's current "Reform 88" program [Ref. 5: p. 1]. A
detailed chronological history of these various initiatives has been
described in a previous Naval Postgraduate School thesis, "Cash
Management Improvement in the Navy Travel Advance System", by
Weesner, December 1984. It is not the intention to duplicate that effort
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here. However, it should be noted that the groundwork for a continuing
cash management effort was established during that timeframe.
The cash management policy in use today throughout the Federal
government is stated in Treasury Department Circular No. 1084. It
requires that agencies conduct their financial activities such that cash
available to the Treasury is maximized and unnecessary borrowing by the
Treasury is precluded. Chapter 8000 of Part 6, Volume 1 of the Treasury
Financial Manual (I TRFM 6-8000) contains the implementing instructions
for this circular. The Federal Claims Collections Standards codify the
policies which govern credit management, and these are described in
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin 83-11, titled "Debt
Collection". This bulletin requires agencies to maintain cash management
and debt collection action plans for implementing new initiatives. These
action plans are monitored by OMB and the Department of the Treasury
[Ref. 2: p. 29].
Three prominent pieces of legislation have significantly strengthened
the control of Federal funds within the last four years:
The Prompt Payment Act of 1982 requires Federal agencies to pay
their bills on time, to pay interest penalties when payments are late,
and to take discounts only when payments are made within the discount
period. The implementing instructions for the Act are contained in OMB
Circular No. A- 125.
The Debt Collection Act of 1982 authorizes Federal agencies to refer
information on delinquent payments to consumer reporting agencies; use
salary offset, where applicable, for recovering delinquent debts; assess
interest, penalties and administrative costs on delinquent debts; and
use private contractors to service and collect government debts. [Ref. 2:
p. 29]
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The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 authorizes the Department of the
Treasury to prescribe the mechanism to be used by Federal agencies to
collect receipts and the time frames for deposit of the funds [Ref. 2: p.
30].
Several sophisticated funds transfer systems have been developed by
the Department of the Treasury to accelerate Federal collections and
disbursements, and are now available to government agencies for their
use. The Treasury Financial Communications System (TFCS) provides for
the transfer of funds between the Department of Treasury and the banking
community through an electronic medium. This system eliminates the
need for checks and the accompanying collection time since the funds are
electronically transferred. This allows the funds to be available for use
on the actual payment date. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
The Automated Clearing House System allows an individual or
organization to authorize the government to automatically deposit or
withdraw funds from a personal or corporate bank account. The funds are
transferred through commercial depositories, Federal Reserve Banks, and
the Department of the Treasury. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
The Lockbox System is an arrangement in which payments are mailed
directly to a creditor's or agency's post office box that is serviced by a
designated bank. The bank processes the checks on the day of receipt and
wire transfers the amount into the agency's account. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
The Cash Concentration System links a network of commercial
depositories when an agency makes deposits to a central concentrator
bank through the automated clearing house system. This system services
19
the Treasury General Account. The funds are transferred into the
Department of the Treasury through an electronic transfer under this
system. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
These Federal cash management regulations and funds transfer system
modernizations have led to a significantly improved cash management
posture at the Federal level. Positive results have been attained through
1985. Following implementation of the Prompt Payment Act of 1982
through the OMB "Prompt Payment" Circular A- 125, 99% of the
government's recent payments are made in a more timely manner so that
interest earned is maximized and late charges are minimized. Two years
ago, 30% of the government's payments were made late and 45% were
made early [Ref. 3: pp. 34-35]. Several other notable achievements are
outlined in the OMB Report on Management of the United States
Government for FY86:
The financing of over $100 billion in government contracts has been
tightened up under a policy change initiated by the Prompt Payment Act.
OMB, through Circular A- 125, advised Federal departments and agencies
that progress payments can no longer be provided for commercial-type
items, nor for items where progress payments are not customary
commercial practice. Unless the exact timing of progress payments is
specified in a contract, progress payments will be made 30 days after
billing. Agencies must require something in return whenever progress
payments are either added after contract award, made more frequently
than monthly, or made at higher than normal rates.
New techniques developed through a joint State/Federal task force
require delivery of $80 billion in Federal grant funds only as they are
needed. Historically, grantees withdrew grant funds early, and then
deposited the funds in their own interest-earning accounts until needed.
The Internal Revenue Service also has cut in half the processing
time for millions of tax payments received at IRS Service Centers
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nationwide. As a result, Treasury will have more than $100 billion
available at least two days sooner, thus reducing the need for borrowed
funds. [Ref. 3: pp. 35-36]
Federal cash management improvement has been steady during the last
fifteen years. There now exists a policy and regulatory framework to
guide agency activities. A summary of Federal Cash Management
Documents is provided in Table 1 [Ref. 7: p. 28]. Cash management
initiatives must now begin to originate from within the Federal agencies
themselves. OMB and Treasury must rely on agency management and the
internal audit function to ensure compliance with government-wide
policies and regulations.
C. CASH MANAGEMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) LEVEL
The cash management regulatory guidance promulgated by the Federal
government applied directly to all public sector agencies, including the
Department of Defense (DOD). The Treasury Cash Management Regulations
(I TRFM 6-8000), OMB Circular NO. 1084, Prompt Payment Act, Debt
Collection Act, and the Deficit Reduction Act have all significantly
influenced DOD"s cash management practices. President Reagan's "Reform
88" program of comprehensive government reform provided additional
impetus to DOD to establish and enforce a more effective program for
managing cash. Management goals of zero interest penalties and early
payments have been established [Ref. 8: p. 2]. Figures 2- 1 and 2-2 depict
DOD interest penalty payments and early payments from FY83 through the
second quarter of FY85. Early payments have effectively been eliminated.
However, interest penalties still present a problem within DOD.
21
TABLE 1
FEDERAL CASH MANAGEMENT DOCUMENTS
Legislative Acts:
Budget And Accounting Act of 1 92
1
Budget And Accounting Procedures Act of 1 950
Debt Collection Act of 1982
Prompt Payment Act of 1 982
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982
Federal Claims Collection Act
Deficit Reduction Act of 1 984
Treasury Department Financial Manual , Volume I:
Part 2, "Central Accounting and Reporting"
Part 4, "Disbursing Regulations"
Part 5, "Deposit Regulations"
Part 6, Chapter 8000, "Cash Management"
Treasury Department Circulars:
1 76, "Depositories and Fiscal Agents"
830, "Disbursing Officers"
945 , "Central According for Revenues and Outlays and Related Assets and Liabilities'
965. "Reporting Year-End status and Closing, or Appropriation and Fund Accounts"
1 075 , "Cosh Advances"




82- 10, "Agency Deposit Transactions"
82-22, "Deposits- In-Transit"
83-14, "TFCS Payments"
Office of Management and Budget Circulars:
A- 01 1 , "Annual Budget Estimates; Preparation of"
A- 034, "Budget Execution"
A- 1 12, "Monitoring Federal Outlays"
A- 123, "Internal Control Systems"
A- 1 25, "Prompt Payment"
A- 1 29, "Managing Federal Credit Programs"
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The Fiscal Year 1986 cash management savings goal established by DOD is
$160.5 million. If attained, this will represent a total DOD savings to the
Treasury of almost $380 million since the cash management program was
formally established in FY83 [Ref. 9: p. 1 ].
D. CASH MANAGEMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (DON) LEVEL
General fiscal policy guidance for the Department of the Navy is
contained in the Navy Comptroller's (NAVCOMPT) Manual. Cash management
specific initiatives are consolidated in the DON Cash Management Action
Plan (CA5HMAP), which was required by OMB Bulletin 83- 11 . The DON
CASHMAP is:
. . . a consolidated approach in applying modern cash management
techniques. These techniques are designed to improve the availability of
cash resources to the Treasury, further the efficiency of its cash
management operations, and decrease requirements for Federal
borrowing. [Ref. 10: p. 2]
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 depict the Navy's interest penalty payments and
early payments from FY83 through the second quarter of FY85. Figures
2-5 and 2-6 show these payments relative to other DOD agencies for the
same period of time. DON has experienced a much more serious problem in
the area of interest penalty payments due to continued delays in invoice
processing. Numerous actions have been taken to correct the situation
including: 1 ) application of Fleet Fast Pay procedures; 2) Navy-wide
advisories; and 3) increased management attention






















Figure 2-3 Navy Interest Penalty Payments
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the DON is $9.45 million, which represents 6% of the total savings
projected for DOD [Ref . 9: p. 1 ].
The success of cash management in the Department of the Navy and
in the Federal government as a whole depends largely on the extent to
which financial managers and operating personnel in each agency accept
the challenge to improve cash management practices within their
individual agencies. This thesis will examine that area with regard to
the Navy Stock Fund and will focus upon identifying potential areas of
cash management improvement within this fund.
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III. NAVY STOCK FUND BACKGROUND AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
A. HISTORY OF THE NAVY STOCK FUND
The Navy Stock Fund (NSF) is the oldest of all the Department of
Defense (DOD) stock funds. The management concept utilized to operate
the NSF is one which actually dates back to 1878 when the "General
Account of Advances" was established to provide financing for Navy
inventories. This was an annually appropriated fund and its size varied
from year to year. Prior to this time all supply inventories were
maintained and issued on the basis of free issue. [Ref. 12: p. 13]
In 1893, Congress passed the "Navy Supply Fund Act" which instituted
the basic concept behind today's NSF operation—the working capital fund.
This act created a "Corpus" or body of capital of $200,000 for
procurement of "ordinary commercial supplies." Standard procedure
called for the Corpus to be reimbursed by customer appropriations when
material was issued to them. Thus, the "revolving nature" of the NSF was
established. [Ref. 13: p. 3]
Legislative action in 1942 officially established the name "Navy
Stock Fund" and increased the size of the Corpus significantly to
accommodate the increased wartime needs and requirements of the Navy
[Ref. 14: p. G-3]. In 1947, Congress began to consider the wider use of
the working capital fund concept within the Department of Defense (DOD).
Both the Senate and House reports on this subject addressed the NSF,
emphasizing its long existence and the benefits achieved by proper
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handling of Inventories of common-use items [Ref. 15: pp. 24-25]. When
the National Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1949, Title 10 U. 5. C.
2208 of that act authorized the Secretary of Defense:
... to require the establishment of working capital funds in the
Department of Defense for the purpose of ( 1 ) financing inventories of
such stores, supplies, materials and equipment as he may designate; and
(2) providing working capital for such industrial-type activities, and for
such commercial-type activities as provide common services within or
among the departments and agencies of the Department of Defense, as he
may designate [Ref 15: pp 25-26].
Working capital funds were now authorized for other services and
agencies within DOD for the purpose of financing supply inventories with
long term goals of recovering all costs and working to a zero profit
[Ref. 14: p. 6-41
In 1955, the Secretary of Defense established a formal charter for
the Navy Stock Fund. This charged the Chief, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts (later named Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command) with
the responsibility for administration and management of the N5F
[Ref. 13: p. 4]. In January 1967, the Department of Defense promulgated
DOD Directive 7420.
1
, "Regulations Governing Stock Fund Operations,"
which contains policy guidance and procedures for administration of the
NSF. This directive remains in effect today and is used by stock fund
administrators to conduct NSF operations. Finally in 1 97 1 , the Navy
Stock Fund charter was revised to establish the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) responsibility for oversight of NSF operations [Ref. 13: p. 4].
The NSF has enjoyed a long and successful operation during the last
ninety years. Since 1893, the NSF Corpus has grown from $200,000 to an
32
estimated $19 billion for FY86. The favorable comments and feelings
expressed by many logistics experts and congressional reviewers over the
years have highlighted the effectiveness and efficiency of the N5F as a
tool for inventory management. The management concept used in its
operation is credited with a great degree of its success. [Ref. 15: p. 45]
This working capital/revolving fund concept is described in detail in the
next section.
B. BASIC OPERATION
The Navy Stock Fund is a working capital or revolving fund established
within DOD by Title 10 U. S. C. 2208 and previous legislation. The purpose
of the NSF is to finance inventories of stores, supplies, materials, and
equipment to support ships, aircraft, personnel, and the shore
establishment of the United States Navy [Ref. 16: p. a-5]. It should be
noted here that a "fund" is defined by the Navy Comptroller's Manual as "a
separate unit of accountability for financial resources"
[Ref. 16: p. a-4]. More specifically, in government accounting, the word
"fund" has a special technical meaning:
A fund is defined as an independent fiscal and accounting entity with
a self-balancing set of accounts recording cash and/or other resources
together with all related liabilities, obligations, reserves, and equities
which are segregated for the purpose of carrying on specific activities
or attaining certain objectives in accordance with special regulations,
restrictions, or limitations. [Ref. 7: p. 16]
Funds are created to allow management personnel to focus on a particular
isolated area as a single entity to allow a more efficient operation in
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that area. It is not government practice, however, for fund managers to
be concerned with making a profit [Ref. 15: p. 49].
Working capital or revolving funds are used as continuous financing
mechanisms for services which are paid for by customers upon
completion of that service. Costs incurred while performing the service
are paid from the working capital fund of the activity actually doing the
job. Upon completion of the job, the customer is billed, and the fund is
reimbursed. As previously mentioned, working capital funds have two
goals: 1 ) recover all costs; and 2) work toward a zero profit
[Ref. 1 4: p. 6-4].
The NSF is an example of a working capital fund which purchases
and holds designated inventories of supply items at various stock points
until they are needed by a customer. This resembles a retail store such
as Sears or J. C. Penney's in the private sector. When the item is issued
to the customer activity, the financing appropriation of that activity is
charged so that the NSF can be reimbursed for the items which were
provided. Figure 3-1 illustrates the basic NSF operation [Ref. 13: p. 51
This operation is further described in the Navy Stock Fund Management
Handbook:
The two principal assets of a Stock Fund are cash and material. Cash
flows out of the fund when vendors are paid for deliveries of material.
Cash flows into the fund as collections are made for issues of material
to the fund's customers. Stock funds recycle cash into inventory and
inventory into cash on a continuing basis just like a local business.
[Ref. 13: pp. 5-6]
Table 2 shows the NSF ending cash and inventory account balances for
FY79 through FY84 [Ref. 17].
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F i q u re 3 - 1 B a s i c NS F p e ra t i o n
TABLE 2
NAVY STOCK FUND CORPUS
($ millions)
Fiscal Year Cash Inventory Total
1979 217 2263 2480
1980 214 2829 3043
1981 263 5867 6130
1982 384 7725 8109
1983 662 9809 10471
1984 1334 12351 13685
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The Management Handbook further states:
As with any commercial retail operation, the stock fund pays
for transporting material to the "store", experiences losses of
material, and procures material in anticipation of customer
demand which doesn't occur. These on-going costs of operating a
"store" result in cash outflow that must be recouped. This is
accomplished by adding a surcharge to the procurement charge of
an item to determine a selling price, or standard price, which is
charged to customers. [Ref . 1 3: p. 6]
Navy Stock Fund surcharges and pricing procedures will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter IV.
C. PROCUREMENT FINANCING
The NSF's obligational authority, the authority to commit the United
States government to pay bills, is acquired through the apportionment
process rather than the appropriation process. Obligational authority is
apportioned from the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) and
allocated to the NSF via the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
NAVCOMPT, and CNO for use whenever it enters into commercial vendor
contracts or places orders with other stock funds. This obligational
authority is budgeted for and requested by the NSF in three separate
programs: operations, inventory augmentation, and mobilization stocks
(prepositioned war reserves). The daily business of replacing
inventory which has been issued to customers constitutes the operational
obligation requirement. Additional cash appropriated by Congress is
usually not associated with this program since the NSF cash is
reimbursed from customer appropriations. The inventory augmentation
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and mobilization programs, however, constitute actual decisions to invest
in inventory growth and represent an increase in the Corpus. Cash for
these two programs must be appropriated by Congress before obligations
can be incurred to procure this additional material. [Ref. 13: pp. 7-81
The N5F differs significantly from a working capital fund such as the
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF), which derives its total spending authority
from its customers' appropriated funds. The NIF normally will not
obligate funds unless they have orders in hand from customers who have
obligational authority. [Ref 13: p. 8]
NSF obligations, conversely, can be made in anticipation of customer
orders, which allows for a more flexible operation. The NSF's authority
to conduct business in this manner comes from a congressional ly
approved device known as contract authority, which permits the NSF to
temporarily finance the procurement lead time of material required by its
customers at a future date. The customer appropriations are obligated
only when a requisition-customer order is placed with the NSF. The
material, ideally, is on hand at the stock point when the customer needs
and orders it and the procurement charges to that end user are deferred
until the material is actually used. [Ref. 13: p. 91
D. SUPPLY SYSTEM OPERATIONS
Two categories of material are currently stocked in the Navy Supply
System: principal and secondary items. An aircraft engine is an example
of a principal item. These are generally end items of equipment which
stand alone and perform a function. Principal items are not financed by
the Navy Stock Fund. They are financed by procurement appropriations and
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are procured based upon program related data rather than recurring
consumption. Principal items, held in the Appropriation Procurement
Account (APA), are issued to the end user without charge to his operating
funds. [Ref. 13: p. 15]
Secondary items are totally financed by the NSF and are held in the
Navy Stock Account (NSA). These are items such as engine components or
transistors which are employed in conjunction with a primary item as it
performs its function. Secondary items are further sub-classified by









Figure 3-2 Secondary Item Sub-classifications
A consumable secondary item is one which cannot be repaired, such as
a gasket or a paper clip. Secondary items which can be repaired are
either Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) or Field Level Repairables (FLRs),
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based upon which type of maintenance level activity is authorized to
decide whether the item is economically repairable or not. The repair of
DLRs is financed by the NSF, while the repair of FLRs is financed by the
customer's operating funds. [Ref. 13: pp. 16-17] Note here, that prior to
1981, DLRs were not financed by the NSF. In April 1981 non-aviation
DLRs were added to the NSF and in April 1985 a test program for
financing aviation DLRs from NSF funds was commenced. This will be
further discussed in section I of this chapter.
E. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER STOCK FUNDS
Navy customers receive supply support from six different stock funds:
Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and
the General Services Administration (GSA). Each of these funds is
maintained as a separate entity. Table 3 depicts the relative size of the
DOD stock funds as of 30 September 1 984 [Ref. 1 7]. Every item in the
Federal Supply System is assigned to one of these DOD or GSA stock funds
for exclusive management. Each item assigned to the Navy is in turn
assigned to a Navy Inventory Control Point (ICP) for wholesale worldwide
management. The NSF, in addition to managing its own items, buys
material from ICP"s within each of the other stock funds, as well as from
commercial vendors, to provide the required support for its customers.
[Ref. 13: p. 18]
The Defense Logistics Agency is a unique stock fund in that it was
created to manage high demand items, common to all branches, which
were previously managed by the individual service stock funds. The NSF,
through the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO), buys these items from
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DLA and, in some cases, direct support is provided to Navy customers
from DLA owned material which is stored at the Navy stock point. The
TABLE 3
DOD STOCK FUND INVENTORY VALUES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1 984
($ in millions)
DOD Stock Fund Inventory I
Navy 12351 34.8
DLA 10533 29.7
Air Force 6758 19.1
Army 5487 15.4
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Figure 3-3 NSF Relationship With Other Stock Funds
NSF relationship with DLA and the other stock funds is illustrated by
Figure 3-3 [Ref. 13: pp. 18-19]. Note again that the NSF supports its
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many customers by procuring Navy managed items from commercial
sources and non-Navy managed items from the five other stock funds.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV Sponsor-OP 04), the Commander, Naval
Supply Systems Command (C0MNAV5UP), is responsible for
administration and management of the Navy Stock Fund. The
Assistant to the Commander for Stock Fund Management (CODE 013)
is tasked by NAVSUP Instruction 5400.4E to:
Establish, review, support, and maintain control of all aspects of the
Navy Stock Fund; insure the development and operation of material and
financial programs for all Navy secondary items; provide assistance to
item managers in the development of stratification and inventory
management programs; provide guidance concerning war reserve
requirements and funding; and coordinate, monitor, analyze N5F
financing of new programs. [Ref. 18: p. 01-3]
In carrying out these duties, CODE 013 simultaneously reports to the
Deputy Commander Financial Management/Comptrol ler (CODE 1 ). The
NAVSUP Headquarters organizational relationships and those within CODE
013 are further delineated in Figure 3-4 Three divisions make up the
Code 013 office: 1) Financial Analysis and Cash Management; 2) Program
Budgeting and Control; and 3) Replenishment Budget. [Ref. 18: p. 01-1]
As illustrated in Figure 3-5, the N5F is financially structured into ten
Budget Projects (BPs) which receive quarterly suballocations of
obligational and commitment authority from NAVSUP. Six of these
projects are managed at the three Navy ICP's: Ships Parts Control Center
(SPCC), Aviation Supply Office (ASO), and the Navy Publications and Forms
Center (NPFC). Three are managed by the Navy Retail Offices: Fleet
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Figure 3-4 NSF Headquarters Organization (NAVSUP)
Office (NAVRE550). The tenth Budget Project is managed by NAVSUP
Code 01 3. [Ref 17] Table 4 provides a description of each Budget
Project [Ref 19: pp. 1-26-1, 1-27]. Table 5 illustrates the relative size

















Figure 3-5 Navy Stock Fund Budget Project Managers
TABLE 4
N5F BUDGET PROJECTS (BP)




Forms and Printed Matter
21 Ships/Commissary Store Stock
23 Ships Overhaul Material
25 Special Navy Stock Account Clearance and Transactions
28 Retail Reapair Parts and Supplies
34 Aviation Consumables
38 Retail Fuel and Related Items
81 Shipboard Depot Level Repairables
85 Aviation Depot Level Repairables
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Three BPs are used in NSF operations which are not part of the supply
system. BP21 finances Commissary Stores and Ships Stores Afloat
Resale items and BP23 is used to finance Ship's Overhaul Material for the
Navy Industrial Fund. BP25 finances fuel reclamation and is used by
NAVSUP as a clearance account for unusual transactions. [Ref. 13: p. 21]
Budget Project managers are responsible for the project budgets, funds
allocation and execution, and accounting. ICP project managers generally
execute the resources suballocated to them by contracting for material
(assigned to them for management) from commercial vendors. The ICP,
TABLE 5
NAVY STOCK FUND SUMMARY FY86
(NAVSUP request, $ in millions)
BP Orders Obligations Expenditures Peacetime Inventon
EOP Value
14 464.7 530.5 484.9 2422.
1
15 14.0 14.8 13.4 18.6
21 1017.6 1033.1 1030.5 126.3
23 192.4 195.0 222.1 28.8
25 1.0 1.0 1.0 -
28 1534.5 1763.8 1 766.
1
1 1 06.0
34 718.6 832.1 954.6 3415.7
38 1849.4 1822.9 1839.0 259.0
81 1005.2 1461.8 1387.1 7022.6
35 1846.3 3347.5 1885.4 42241
TOT 8643.7 11002.5 9584. 18623.2
however, does not hold this material on its premises. The delivery of the
material is consigned to Navy stock points which actually receive and
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store it in their warehouses. Afloat outlets are also used and include the
Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) ships, tenders, and aircraft
carriers which carry a tailored range of material to enable support for a
specific group of customers or purpose. [Ref. 13: p. 23]
Fleet Material Support Office project management is similar to the
ICP process because no NSF material is held on FMSO premises. However,
the execution of FMSO's resources differs from the ICP's in that FMSO
makes its Budget Projects (which finance retail repair parts, supplies and
fuel) available to the ashore and afloat NSF outlets to spend through
specific and open allotment for each BP. [Ref. 13: pp. 95-96] Specific
and open allotments will be described in more detail in section H.
The total number of FMSO Stock Fund activities exceeded 430 in FY84.
A breakdown is provided in Table 6 which depicts the wide range of units
that constitute the lowest level of the NSF structure [Ref. 20].
6. STOCK POINT INVENTORY STRUCTURE.
NSF inventories are carried at many afloat and ashore outlets. Table 7
shows the distribution of NSF inventories as of 30 September 1984
[Ref. 17]. As mentioned in the previous section, the NSF afloat outlets
consist of Mobile Logistics Support Force ships which carry tailored
inventory lists for specific customers such as the Aviation Consolidated




FMSO STOCK FUND ACTIVITIES
Ashore Afloat
Naval Supply Centers 8 AFS/AO/TAO 39
Naval Supply Depots 3 AS/AD/AR 29
Naval Air Stations/ CV/CVN 14
Facilities 23 LHA/LPH 12
Marine Corps Air MAG 11
Stations/Facilities 7
Naval Hospitals 19






Total Outlets 328 107
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF NSF INVENTORIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1984
($ in millions)
Ashore Afloat
CONUS Overseas Supplv Ships Total
Aviation 2034.8 127.8 232.2 2394.8
Ship Parts 7857.1 50.6 408.0 8315.7
General Support 658.9 467.3 406.7 1532.9
Commissary and
Ships Stores 542 20.3 33.1 107.6
Total 10605.0 666.0 1080.0 12351.0
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Inventories carried in the NSF at the various stock points ashore are
divided into wholesale and retail segments. The NAVCOMPT manual
defines wholesale and retail inventories as follows:
a. Wholesale . Wholesale inventories are those managed by
Navy inventory managers under the DOD single manager concept.
These are items for which the Navy is the primary user. They are
purchased from vendors under contracts and "pushed" or directed
to various stock points based on projected customer
requirements. This includes the requirements of other military
services which may utilize the item. Financial inventory
accounting for these inventories, when stocked at activities
operating under the Centralized Accounting and Billing (CAB)
concept, is performed by the cognizant inventory control point
(ICP) which also maintains visibility of quantities and locations
of inventories. This asset visibility and accountability is
facilitated through transaction item reports (TIR) submitted by
the stock points operating under the CAB concept for each receipt
or issue of an item of inventory. Financial inventory accounting
for wholesale stock at non-CAB activities is performed by the
local stock point.
b. Retail. Items carried in retail inventories are those
managed by other DOD components and General Services
Administration, but stocked by the Navy for its own use. There is
no Navy-wide visibility of these assets, and it is the
responsibility of the local stock point including ships and
aviation units designated as special accounting class 207 units
(NSF financed load and allowance list carried on board) to ensure
adequate stocks to satisfy local customer demands. Retail
inventory also includes items managed by Navy inventory
managers under the DOD single manager concept for which the
Navy is the primary user, however, the inventory is held below the
wholesale level as defined in subpar. a. [Ref. 19: p. 1-1]
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Wholesale material is provided to or "pushed" to the stockpoints by Navy
ICPs and in some cases by the Defense Logistics Agency for storage and
issue. The wholesale material is held in the "main store" of the stock
point and it is from these "main stores" that the supply system provides
requisitioned material to Navy customers. [Ref. 14: pp. 6-9,G-10] To
support local Navy customers, the stock point can also maintain retail
outlets separate from the main store. Retail material can be ordered
from vendors or other stock funds-or may be recategorized from
wholesale stock in the "main store" to retail stock. The stock point
effectively "pulls" the material when it orders from other sources. This
retail material can be stocked in either the "Ready Supply Store" which
serves a particular customer located near the stock point or in a
"Sen/mart" which provides ready access to high demand consumable Hems
for local customers. [Ref. 14: pp. 6-9,6-101
New NSF obligational authority is not committed when Navy
wholesale material is recategorized as retail material by a stock point.
This is an intra-Navy transfer which involves the transfer of
accountability for the material from the ICP level to the stock point.
Physical movement of the material may or may not occur. Similarly,
when material is ordered from the wholesale stock of one Navy stock
point to be placed in retail stock at another Navy stock point (actual
physical movement of the material occurs), no new NSF obligational
authority is used. This type of action is called an "Other Supply Officer"
(OSO) transfer which also transfers accountability for the material.
When DLA wholesale material held at a Navy stock point is recategorized
as retail material new NSF obligational authority is used. This transfer
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is not an intra-Navy action and the NSF is actually purchasing the
material from the DLA stock fund. [Ref. 14: p. 6-10] Figure 3-6
summarizes the various types of inventory that may be held at a Navy



































Figure 3-6 NSF Stock Point Inventory Structure
H. ACCOUNTING
The NSF is an apportioned revolving fund which purchases material
from its cash account and carries it in the Navy Stock Account. Since it
is an apportioned and revolving fund, three types of accounting are
required to be performed for the NSF: 1 ) obligational accounting; 2)
financial Inventory accounting; and 3) revolving fund accounting.
Obligational and financial accounting are decentralized to the BP/stock
point levels while revolving fund accounting is centrally provided by the
Navy Regional Finance Center (NRFC) in Washington D.C. [Ref. 13: p. 100]
A description of each accounting type will be provided in this section.
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1. Obligational Accounting
Obligational accounting is performed within each BP by the
Authorization Accountng Activity (AAA) assigned to each activity
holding N5F obligational authority. The procedures used by the AAA in
accomplishing this task, and which agency acts as the AAA, is dependent
upon which obligational accounting method is used by the BP manager in
executing his allotted obligational authority. Specific Allotments,
Centrally Managed Allotments or direct execution of the obligational
authority are available for the BP managers use [Ref. 1 3: p. 94].
Specific allotments are provided by BP managers to various field
activities, such as a Naval Supply Center (NSC), by a NAVCOMPT Form 372
Allotment Authorization and the recipient receives R.S. 3679
responsibility (responsibility not to overspend a maximum dollar limit)
for the obligational authority. As described in section F of this chapter,
the Fleet Material Support Office provides this type of allotment to its
retail stock points to enable them to order supplies from commercial
vendors and other stock funds [Ref. 13: pp. 94-95]. When specific
allotment accounting is used, the AAA processes procurement
transactions against allotted NSF obligational authority for each activity.
These transactions are classified as commitments (requests for contract
procurement), obligations (firm contracted orders) and expenditures
(actual disbursements of allotted funds). Receipt of material is also
tracked to maintain accurate records of accounts payable (material
received but not paid for) and material-in-transit (paid for but not
received). Figure 3-7 depicts the various obligational accounting
50
categories of the NSF. A monthly summary of all the obligational
authority transactions for each specific allotment holder (NAVCOMPT
Form 2129 Status of Fund Authorization - Stock Fund) is compiled by the















Figure 3-7 NSF Obligational Accounting Categories
A centrally managed or open allotment may be used by a BP manager
to finance NSF obligations incurred by units which do not hold a specific
NSF allotment. In this case the BP project manager serves as the AAA and
retains R.S. 3679 responsibility for the CMAs he has established. NSF
obligations become simultaneous expenditures when the AAA/BP manager
is notified that disbursements have been charged against this type of
allotment. [Ref. 12: p. 96]
As discussed in section F, BP managers at Navy ICPs execute their
obligational authority directly by procuring the "wholesale" material
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assigned to the Navy and in turn to the BP managers for management. The
ICP normally delegates this execution responsibility to various sections
of the ICP in the form of operating targets (OPTAR) and then tracks by
month the status of the OPTAR assigned to each element. The ICP project
manager maintains R.5. 3679 responsibility in this case. [Ref. 13: p. 98]
A monthly consolidated report of NSF execution which sums the
specific allotment reports, CMA status reports and internal obligational
accounting for each BP is provided by the respective project manager to
NAVSUP by means of a Project Control Ledger Summary Report (NAV5UP
Form 1091). A NSF summary report, which combines all BP 1091 reports
and summaries of Treasury cash transactions for each BP, is prepared and
forwarded via CNO/NAVCOMPT to OSD/OMB to officially report the
execution status of the NSF apportionment. [Ref. 13: pp. 98,100]
2. Financial Inventory Accounting
Financial inventory accounting in the NSF was established by the
National Security Act of 1947 which required that financial records or
accounts be maintained on all material held in store by military
departments [Ref. 21: p. 22]. NAVCOMPT 034000.2 lists the following as
additional purposes of Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting:
to ensure the integrity of stock funds and to maintain similar
financial safeguards over material acquired under other appropriations.
to provide a source for the preparation of stock fund statements and
status reports of appropriation financed inventories for submission to
the Deparment of Defense.
to furnish inventory managers with essential financial data for
budgetary requirements. [Ref. 21: p. 23]
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Although the NSF cash account is centralized at the NAV5UP level, NSF
inventory is decentralized and financially accounted for at each
stockpoint. The source of the reported value of the inventory is the
Financial Inventory Report (FIR) which essentially starts with the
month's beginning inventory balance in financial terms (valued at NSF
standard prices), adds inventory receipts, subtracts inventory
expenditures and displays the month's ending inventory value
[Ref. 13: p. 101]. (More detail regarding the FIR can be obtained from
Schick's Naval Postgraduate School masters thesis, "An Analysis of the
Financial Inventory Reporting Structure", December, 1982.)
The daily financial transactions at the stock point are recorded in
Financial Inventory Control Ledgers (FICL) and are maintained by the stock
point's Authorized Accounting Activity (AAA) or Financial Information
Processing Center (FIPC). The FICLs are summed monthly to make up the
FIR which is forwarded, along with associated billing documents, to the
appropriate Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center (FAADC), with a copy
to the respective BP manager. To ensure that the balances of the
financial records match the value of inventory on hand or in store, the
FICLs are matched with the Master Stock Inventory Records (MSIR) on a
quarterly basis. Differences are accounted for and corrected during this
"reconciliation" process. When the activity FIRs are received, FAADCLANT
and FAADCPAC combine them, register charges to the NSF customers and
forward summaries to NRFC Washington for their use in revolving fund
accounting [Ref. 14: p. G-21].
It should be pointed out here that under the Centralized Accounting
and Billing (CAB) system which is operated by ICPs, the larger stock
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points, such as NSC San Diego, are not required to do FIR reporting and
billing for Navy managed (wholesale) material held in their main stores.
ICPs maintain the FICLs for this material and prepare the summary FIRs
and billing documents for submission to the FAADCs. These stock points
do, however, submit daily inventory Transaction Item Reports (TIR) to the
ICPs, which are part of a separate inventory management system, and
provide the information required by the ICPs to prepare the FIR.
[Ref. 13: p. 104]
3. Revolving Fund Accounting
Revolving fund accounting for the NSF is performed by NRFC,
Washington D.C., and establishes the NSF as a fiscal entity. Financial
inputs received from the Treasury Department, the obligational
accounting system, the financial inventory accounting system and other
sources, are used to prepare an income statement and balance sheet for





Material in transit Corpus
Net Earnings
Figure 3-8 NSF Balance Sheet
The two principal assets listed on the NSF balance sheet are cash and
inventory. The inventory value is provided to NRFC by the monthly
Financial Inventory Reports prepared by the AAA/FIPC which is added to a
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centrally produced FIR to account for the inventory value of NSF material
which is in transit between stock points. The cash asset is the
theoretical cash balance held in the centralized Treasury cash account
( 1 7X49 1 1 ) which is established for the NSF. This cash account is
affected by all daily NSF collections and disbursements which are
reported by disbursing officers at the various supply activities, acting as
agents of the Treasury Department. Material-in-transit (paid for from
cash but not yet received) value is derived from the monthly obligational
accounting reports and total accounts receivable (material issued from
inventory but not yet paid to cash) are obtained from reports submitted in
conjunction with those reports. The accounts payable liability (material
received but not yet paid for from cash) is also derived from the
obligational accounting reports. Two capital equity accounts are
maintained: the Corpus and Net Earnings. The Corpus represents the
initial capitalization of the fund plus or minus any alterations made by
Congress since its inception. Net Earnings represents cumulative gains or
losses from operations. [Ref. 14: pp. G- 17, G- 18]
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
I. Depot Level Repairables (DLRs )
Prior to 1981 the NSF initially financed only secondary expense
items. The remainder of the supply system principal items and secondary
DLRs were funded by procurement appropriations and were issued to
customer activities on a free issue basis. As the result of a Department
of the Navy study released on 15 August 1979 entitled, "Depot Level
Repairables-An Analysis of Current and Alternative Methods of Funding," a
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test program was commenced on 1 April 1981 which changed the
financing of Navy managed Non-Aviation DLRs from procurement and
centrally managed 0&M,N appropriations to the NSF. The study concluded
that this shift should be undertaken for the following reasons:
—Improved supply system discipline resulting from the
buyer-seller relationship inherent in a stock funded
environment vice the current free issue procedure.
—Improved financial flexibility due to the ability to tradeoff
procurement and repair during budget execution.
—Improved budget forecasting due to shorter stock fund
budget leadtimes.
—Improved material support responsiveness due to the stock
fund's ability to respond to emergent requirement without
the need for reprogramming action. [Ref. 22: pp. 1 -3, 1 -A]
The test program of Budget Project 81 , managed by 5PCC in
Mechanicsburg
,
Pennsylvania, was appraised as a success in an August
1983 Navy evaluation report which cited significant improvements in
readiness due to the increased availability of material gained through the
addition of Non-Aviation DLRs to the NSF [Ref. 13: p. 108]. Non-Aviation
DLR availability increased by 30% during this period while Aviation DLR
availability increased by only 5%. In addition increased carcass return
rates from customers of Non-Aviation DLRs resulted in a $300 million
cost savings. [Ref. 23: p. 1-5]
Due to the success of the Non-Aviation DLR program the Navy
commenced another test program on 1 April 1985 to evaluate NSF
financing of Aviation DLRs. These items were capitalized into NSF
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Budget Project 85 under ASO management with the evaluation scheduled
to be completed on 30 September 1988. [Ref. 13: p. 108]
2. NSF Financing of Ship's Overhaul Material
Naval Shipyards are financed by the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF), a
working capital fund which, unlike the NSF, cannot use contract authority
to procure required supplies. Prior to FY83 the funds required by the NIF
to obtain materials with long procurement leadtimes for a ship overhaul
were budgeted for in customer operating appropriations in advance of the
first fiscal year of the overhaul. In Program Budget Decision 623 of 21
December 1981, Congress reduced the 0&M,N budget by $82.7 million and
directed that the Navy use the NSF to procure the advance material for the
Fleet Modernization and Maintenance Program. [Ref. 24] The NIF in effect
gains the use of the NSF's contract authority and the NSF is reimbursed
for the material from customer operating funds in the actual fiscal year
the overhaul is commenced [Ref. 13: p. 111].
Budget Project 23, under the management of 5PCC in
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, was established to finance the ship
overhaul material which is carried in a Special Accounting Class 233
Financial Inventory Control Ledger (FICL). This material is reported as
BP23 inventory until requisitions are placed for the material during the
fiscal year of the overhaul. [Ref. 25]
3. Inventory Augmentation Appropriated Funds
Appropriated funds must be authorized by Congress before the NSF
can procure additional material for the inventory augmentation and
mobilization stock programs. Prior to FY83 the requirement to obtain
newly appropriated funds did not exist for inventory augmentation. The
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NSF enjoyed relative freedom in increasing stock levels by using its cash
for procurement from commercial vendors. Congress took exception with
the NSF process and began to impose restrictions on the NSF's ability to
increase its inventory levels. [Ref. 14: p. 6-26] The 1982 and 1983 DOD
Appropriation Bills highlighted these restrictions:
We do not believe that sizeable build-up in stock fund inventories
should be accomplished through the pricing mechanism. Instead DOD
should request direct appropriations into the stock fund.
The Defense Department is placed on notice that future reductions
will be considered to the extent that (DOD) violates the directive that
cash available in the stock fund is not to be used for inventory build-up
for force expansion or new weapons systems. [Ref. 17].
Congress, thus, has mandated that no stock funded requirements
which represent increases in approved levels of inventories can be
executed without congressional approval. Inventory augmentation
includes initial and follow-on system stock for new weapons systems,
outfitting for NSF activities and any special initiatives that increase
safety levels or insurance stocks. Since NSF inventory augmentation
requirements are now funded through congressional appropriations, these
requirements must be included in the annual budget submissions, and are
therefore subject to the normal two year gap between identification of
the requirement and receipt of funds to execute the program. [Ref. 17]
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IV. CURRENT NAVY STOCK FUND CASH MANAGFMFNT PRACTICES
A. CASH MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE
Major emphasis has been placed on cash management within the
Federal government during the past fifteen years. Numerous instructions
and directives (listed in Table 1 ) have been generated to aid in controlling
the timing and flow of Treasury cash. In addition to cash flow, the cash
balances of certain Federal operations have been targeted as areas for
potential cash management improvement. Due to the revolving nature of
the Navy Stock Fund, cash management translates to control of both cash
flow and position. It should be noted that, while purchasing and inventory
control is primarily decentralized to the Inventory Control Point (ICP) and
Navy stock point level, cash management is highly centralized within the
NSF at NAVSUP and NAVCOMPT. Below this headquarters level there is an
awareness in cash management but little genuine control or concern.
The overall objective of minimizing Federal "cash" held outside the
Treasury has been strenuously pursued throughout the Federal government
in an effort to minimize the need to borrow additional funds. "Cash", in
this context, is not the hard currency which normally comes to mind but
is rather the obligational authority set aside for specific agencies' use.
In the case of the Navy Stock Fund, this authority is appropriated to OSD
and then apportioned to the various DOD Funds—NSF being one of the
latter.
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NSF's theoretical objective for cash management is to "break even" by
having revenue equal to expenses. "Break even" denotes a zero balance
cash position. The difference between the revenue and the expenses
(collections and expenditures), is called outlay and it is to this outlay
target that NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT manage their cash. In reality, the N5F
cash balance objective is set to provide for a cushion of 1 1 days of
operations (a "massaged" value based on average daily disbursement rate)
and ensure against a negative ending cash position in any given month.
This 1 1-day target is a temporary reduction from a 15-day DOD policy and
was directed by the House Appropriations Committee. The direction has
been promulgated by OSD via Program Budget Decision (PBD):
The approved stock fund programs will result in cash balances in
both fiscal years that approximate an 1 1-day cash objective. Athough
the cash balances are postured at 1 1 days as they were in FY 1984, no
change to the Department's policy pertaining to the 15-day cash
objective is recommended due to the lack of sufficient experience at the
lower cash level. Additional experience is necessary to validate an
1
1
-day cash objective. [Ref. 26: p. 1]
The House Appropriations Committee directed the department to
operate on the basis of an 1 1 -day cash objective in FY84 [Ref. 26: p. 2].
While the Navy and the Air Force expressed concern over this lower
level, their stock funds remained solvent in FY84 and DOD policy
continued at the 1 1-day level for FY85 and FY86. Any cash held in excess
of the 1 1-day level therefore represents lost economic opportunity,
possible unreplenished stocks, and potential transfer by higher authority-
a loss to the Navy which can result in a "loss of program" (e.g., this
money could be used elsewhere to procure a new ship or system.)
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In the spirit of minimizing Treasury cash held outside the Department,
Mr. Bob Davis, a member of the House Appropriations Committee Staff,
suggested that the NSF cash objective be reduced to 7 days vice the
1 1-day target. NAVSUP's answer observed that a 7 day operating cash
objective (approximately $190 million based on operating cash, massaged
for average daily disbursement rate) could be completely eroded by as
little as 1 % variation in the nearly $ 1 8.5 billion through-put (sum of
expenditures and collections). With the uncertainty and risks involved the
Navy concluded that, ". . . any reduction to existing cash balances is not
considered prudent by the NSF manager." [Ref. 271
The NSF cash management challenge then is to minimize cash
position to the directed 1 1-day objective while controlling the flow of
cash and, most importantly, providing the best possible continued support
to the Fleet.
B. .CASH MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
Actual controls over the balance and flow of NSF cash are rather
limited. Controls do exist in both the short and long term, however most
of them are severely limited in scope and application. Short term refers
to the current year when Stock Fund managers are executing the budget
that has been approved and "locked in". These controls would ideally be
exercised when the cash balance is observed to be increasing or
decreasing at an undesirable rate. Long term expands the time horizon to
contain the "out years", the next two years in which fiscal year budgets
are in various stages of preparation and approval. The following is a list
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of these controls, each of the which will be discussed along with their





2. Adjust standard prices and/or surcharges
3. Alter rates of transactions or processing
4. Restrict obligational authority.
Long term:
1. Forecasting
2. Set standard pricing
3. Transfer of item management between funds
1. Short Term
The short term controls listed above appear on the surface to give
the stock fund manager many ways to influence and manage cash during
the current period. In fact this is not true,
a. Loans or Transfers
Loans or transfers of cash to or from the Defense Stock Fund
(DLA managed), other military stock funds (Army, Air Force, or Marines),
or an appropriation (i.e. 0&M,N) can and have been used in the past to
support a particular fund's position. A loan, however, is only a temporary
solution which will have to be paid back. Transfers between stock funds
are no longer an option. Congress has mandated that the stock funds be
self-sufficient and interfund transfers of cash are no longer allowed.
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. . .
Congressional limitation that prohibits transfer of funds from one
working capital fund to another. This restricts flexibility which was
available until recently in that stock funds cannot now rebalance cash
resources when they become inadequate. [Ref. 27]
DLA, which has historically had excess cash (for reasons which will be
discussed later), has been the source of many of these transfers.
Transfers between appropriations (i.e. reprogramming between 0&M,N and
Navy Stock Account (N5A)) are not allowed without specific
Congressional approval. [Ref. 17] In FY85, a transfer of $194.5 million
was made to 0&M,N from the N5F. As a result of a $300M budget mark
against FY86 0&M,N the N5F is transferring $300M to the customers'
0&M,N account, with Congressional approval. [Ref. 28]
b. Adjusting Standard Pricing
The second short term control, adjusting the standard pricing of
items, seems like a perfect tool for controlling the cash position and
flow within the NSF. Private business uses this tool quite well to adjust
their sales to desired levels in order to maintain sales volume and control
their inventory. Unfortunately, this option is not open to stock funds.
Standard prices and surcharges are fixed at the OSD level and cannot be
changed (with only minor exceptions) during the execution year. This is
done to ensure a stable financial environment and to protect the budgeted
"program". Surcharges are either a function of the pricing/budgeting
process or are handed down from the President's budget via OMB. A recent
example is the computed 10.2% price reduction in FY87, established to
"burn down" a projected $930M cash excess in that year. Pricing and
budgeting will be addressed in more depth in Section G of this chapter.
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c. Adjusting Transaction Rates
The third short term control of slowing down or speeding up
transaction and processing rates would allow a short term fix for cash in
those Budget Projects with shorter Financial lead times (FLT - the time
between obligation and expenditure). Some believe that, to a small
degree, these activities take place. Once again though, this is not a viable
option. Legislation such as the Prompt Payment Act and the Deficit
Reduction Act set firm limits and guidelines on the timing of billings and
disbursements. There are some improvements yet to be made in these
areas, specifically in interest charges for delinquent payment of bills.
d. Restricting Obligational Authority
Finally, restricting the obligational authority of inventory
managers and stock points would serve to slow the obligations and
expenditures in the short run but the potential for degraded support to the
Fleet is very high. If an inventory manager could not afford to replenish
stock in a particular area, stockouts would occur and the availability of
those items would drop drastically, creating an unsatisfactory supply and
readiness environment. It is virtually impossible to measure the cost of
such a stockout, especially in a crisis situation.
2. Long Term
a. Pricing and Forecasting
Long term controls are different in that they offer the stock
fund manager some degree of actual control on N5F cash. It is generally
agreed that pricing is the primary cash management tool for the N5F.
Further, NAVCOMPT sets the prices as noted by Captain E.M. Straw, Deputy
Commander, Financial Management / Comptroller at NAV5UP:
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Cash adjustments to the NSF are a NAVCOMPT responsibility and will
be implemented via the NSF pricing mechanism [Ref. 29].
While pricing is certainly a main control mechanism, the more
fundamental, and therefore more critical control, is the ability to
forecast the cash position and predict the various factors that enter into
the pricing equation. The forecasting process is the basis of pricing. The
entire pricing structure is dependent on the accuracy of forecasts of cash
position and the various accounts and transactions that affect NSF cash.
Forecasting and pricing will be discussed in Sections F and G of this
chapter.
b. Transfers of Item Management
The third long term control is the actual transfer of item
management between stock funds. For several years fast turnover, high
volume items have been transferred to the Defense Logistic Agency after
being procured and financed by the NSF. The rationale behind this
Consumable Item Transfer (CIT) lies in Economic Order Quantity savings,
more centralized control of common items, and a desire to cut down the
workload at Navy ICPs [Ref. 30]. The impact on cash is that DLA receives
a sizeable amount of inventory without expending funds. On the other
hand, the NSF finances this inventory for DLA but receives no revenue
from the material. This has resulted in DLA having an excess of cash
(having received the collections without having made the expenditure). By
nature of this cash generating potential, item management could
theoretically be shifted as a cash management tool in order to counter
low cash balances or slow cash flow situations. This would be a massive
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undertaking, requiring large amounts of time and effort, and would yield
an uncertain outcome. In addition, a recent freeze has been placed on
item transfers, specifically to DLA, in an effort to further assist stock
funds become self-sufficient. This freeze cannot be lifted without
approval of the Navy Comptroller's office. Prior to lifting this freeze, a
method of financing such transfers must be found to avoid the cash
windfalls or losses experienced in the past. [Ref. 28]
Short and long term controls do exist. The control in the short
term is effectively limited to the sometimes difficult task of a
Congressional ly approved transfer of funds with the other options being
either unavailable or ineffective in current stock fund operations. The
long term controls of forecasting and the resultant pricing mechanisms
are the only real controls available to stock fund managers. Information
for forecasting and pricing comes from all levels, yet the responsibility,
and therefore the real control, lies at the headquarters level within
NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT.
C. BILLINGS AND COLLECTIONS
The Federal government has identified billings and collections as
areas for cash management attention. The primary aspect of these areas
which impacts on cash is in the timing of the transactions; by speeding
up both billings and collections one can minimize the amount of cash held
outside the Treasury cash account and reduce the amount of borrowing.
Legislation and directives including the Prompt Payment Act, Debt
Collection Act of 1982, Treasury Fiscal Requirements Manual (TFRM)
Chapter 8000, and Treasury Circular 1084 give specific direction for the
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timing of billings and collections. Billing must be initiated within one
working day of the billing department being advised of completion of
service or the release to shipment of the goods being paid for. Payment
due dates and interest penalties for late payments must be included in
writing along with the invoice. In general, payments will be due within
30 days of receipt of a bill.
Various systems exist for speeding up the actual collection including:
1 ) lockbox; and 2) electronic funds transfers (EFT) via the Treasury
Financial Communications System (TFCS). The latter is particularly
effective in forwarding funds to the Treasury because it
eliminates both the handling and clearing delays of checks and makes
funds available on the same day.
While these methods and systems are effective in speeding up the
collection of cash at the Federal level, they do little for cash within the
N5F structure for the following reasons: 1 ) the vast majority of
transactions between the.NSF and the Treasury are simply accounting
entries (within the Treasury) that do not involve cash; 2) the portion of
transactions that is made up of hard cash consists primarily of ship's
store and commissary receipts; 3) other Federal agencies (i.e. the Coast
Guard), and private parties (contractors using N5F material in their
production efforts), and foreign sales are issued material under cash sale
procedures; and 4) the rest of the transactions are serviced through
either Intra Navy or Inter Department of Defense transfers which result
in "immediate cash" collections into the financing appropriation.
Intra Navy and inter departmental transactions are described as
follows:
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Intra Navy collections are accomplished by the use of the Report Fund
Authorization Charges (NAVCOMPT Form 2074) with related detail
accounting cards to the customer and an equivalent Labor/Roll Material
Charges and Credits (NAVCOMPT Form 2051 ) to the Fleet Accounting and
Disbursing Centers (FAADC) for registering to Treasury.
Inter Department of Defense collections are processed via the
interfund billing process. Cash collections are effected based upon
Summary Billing Cards and supporting details provided to the customer
and exact copies which are used by the FAADC to register the
collections from other Service's funds. [Ref. 30]
Both of the above result in theoretical "immediate" cash in that the
NSF cash balance is incremented as soon as the data is recorded via the
registering cycle. This normally is completed within a one month
window.
Several notable exceptions have been cited in recent history which
raise questions as to the blanket validity of "immediate cash". Problems
have been noted in general processing delays, reporting lags and estimate
errors, CMA accounting and reconciliation between financial and inventory
accounting systems. These will be addressed further in Chapter V.
D. DISBURSEMENTS
The impact of disbursements on cash management is similar to that
discussed in the previous section. The same directives govern the timing
of payments for procurement to contractors. The Prompt Payment Act
directs payments to be made on time, not early or late, in order to take
advantage of any discounts and to avoid financing contractors' operations.
Prior to this act, standard practice was to make payments within a few
days of receipt of the bill. Implementation therefore resulted in a cash
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excess of several weeks worth of expenditures which were delayed until
the thirty day limit. At the same time this legislation established
interest charges as penalties for delinquent payments.
The same inter/intra fund mechanisms mentioned in Section C are used
for disbursements between funds. Actual payments for procurement are
made by the FAADCs and NRFC as described in Chapter III. This rather
complicated process suffers from "too many hands" and is unnecessarily
lengthy. DOD branches have made great strides in decreasing the amount
of "late interest" payments, but the Navy maintains its unenvied position
as the branch paying the highest percentage. Figure 2-5 shows the
relative level of interest payments for each of the Armed Services.
Command attention from all levels has been directed toward this problem
area and improvements are being made. However, some feel that the Navy
has gone beyond the point of marginal return in that the cure is costing
more than the ill. Perhaps by establishing a decentralized disbursement
authority, a number of the steps in the payment process could be
eliminated with a resultant decrease in the time involved.
E. DEPOSITS
The goal of Federal cash management is to expedite the deposit of
funds, minimizing the need to borrow and the resulting interest payments.
TRFM Chapter 8000 and Treasury Circular 1084 address funds deposit and
specify both the frequency of deposit (when total cash equals $1000 or at
least once a week) and the timing of deposits (as early in the day as
possible). Again, TFC5, EFT, and Lockbox are all methods to support this
effort.
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How big is the impact of these systems within the NSF? As stated
above, the vast majority of "deposits" are inter/intra fund transfers in
which the money never leaves the Treasury. Deposits by Disbursing
Officers of receipts from ships stores, commissaries, and collections
from contractors and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are generally made
expeditiously via bank drafts and are sufficiently small so they are not a
major concern to the NSF managers. Certainly, continued attention should
be given to these areas at the Disbursing Officer level in the interest of
good cash management practice.
Note that the revolving nature of the NSF actually returns deposits to
the Navy Stock Fund Cash Account vice the Treasury's General Cash
Account. Therefore, the advantages of the TFCS and lockbox systems are
somewhat negated. Transfers of cash from the NSF generally flow to
other Navy accounts (usually 0&M,N) in order to conserve Total
Obligational Authority (TOA) and maintain programs. When funds are
transferred out of the Navy they go into DOD where they may be
re-apportioned to other stock funds or appropriations. DOD may, on the
other hand, give funds back to the Treasury.
In summary, the Navy Stock Fund managers are operating effectively in
the areas of billings and collections, disbursements, and deposits. They
are following the regulations governing these areas and have made
progress in improving NSF cash management. Although continued efforts
are paying off, some fine tuning is always possible. Areas for potential
improvement will be reviewed in the next chapter. The primary cash
management tool, the pricing mechanism, is dependent on the subject of
the next section, forecasting.
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F. FORECASTING
Forecasting cash position and flow can be a frustrating and costly
venture. It is difficult at best and sometimes nearly impossible. Often
there is little direct incentive to undertake the task, but it is a
fundamental part of good cash management and must be given the
attention it requires. Because end-of-year cash balances have been
significantly different from predictions, the process of forecasting NSF
cash has received high levels of attention. Uncertainty is the name of
the game and common sentiments among NSF cash managers are reflected
in phrases describing the forecasting process as "more coincidence than
design" [Ref. 31: p. 6] or more simply, "Lots of luck is involved" [Ref. 17].
Because forecasting has a critical impact on cash management, continued
efforts are underway to "fine tune" the process using advances in
statistical methods and data processing. The question must eventually
evolve to what level of accuracy is desired and at what cost. This section
will address the need for forecasting, the basic structure of NSF cash
forecasting and the various factors and trends that influence the Navy
Stock Fund's cash.
I. Importance of NSF Cash Forecasts
Pricing has been identified as the primary management control
mechanism within the NSF. The cash forecast is the single most
important input to the entire pricing process. In addition to their
importance in pricing, the cash forecasts provide the basis for the
present management evaluation criteria. As stated before, NAV5UP
manages to an outlay target, the difference between the collections
forecast and the expenditures forecast. ICP level managers are tasked
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with "managing to the deviation", the difference between customer orders
and obligations. Both orders and obligations values are intimately tied to
the cash forecasts.
Beyond the pricing base and the establishment of management
targets, another important use of the forecasted information lies in the
NSF budgeting process. The FY87 input for the President's Budget
submission has been generated more than two years prior to execution. A
single number estimate must be made for the end-of-period cash position
included in the Navy Stock Fund budget submission to 05D. This figure is
generated through the forecasting process, and is the basis of all NSF
operations planning. Note that at least five formal reviews of the
forecast take place between the original budget submission and execution.
The importance of accuracy in these forecasts is implicit in their
applications. Further, striving for improved forecasting has been an
ongoing effort. Concurrent with a Navy Audit Service review of NSF cash
in 1976, NAVSUP contracted for development of a NSF financial
forecasting system (Office of Naval Research contract
N00014-72-C-0266). One purpose of this system was to enable
prediction of cash balances. The results of a 1976 follow-on study will
be discussed later in this section. The accuracy of the NSF forecast for
FY84 and FY85 is reflected Table 8 [REF. 32,33]. As can be seen from the
table, forecast errors for disbursements are running significantly higher
than for collections and the outlay target is being missed by factors of
5.5 % to 14%. These are significant variances and, given the total amount
of funds in the NSF, represent a large amount of cash. The $588 million
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TABLE 8
NSF CASH ERROR RATES FOR FY84, FY85
(amounts in $ millions)
FY 84 Forecast Actual Error % Error ^Throughput Error
Disbursement 7336 6449 (887) (14) (7)
Collections 6825 6488 (337) (5) (3)
Outlay 511 (39) (550) 1410 • 4
Throughput 14161 12937 (1224) (9) (9)
EYS5
Disbursements 8420 7150 (1270) (18) (9)
Collections 7939 7257 (682) (9) (5)
Outlay 481 (107) (588) 550 4
Throughput 16359 14407 (1952) (14) (14)
[Data compiled from actual FY84 and FY85 data]
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cash excess in FY85 represents a good deal of "program" not bought by the
Navy and, in the macro view, a large sum that the Treasury would not have
had to borrow if the forecast had been closer.
This is not to say that the NSF managers are not working diligently
to improve accuracy in forecasting cash. There are factors and forces
that interplay to make these forecasts difficult. As these factors are
better understood, identified, and where possible quantified, the cash
forecasts should improve accordingly. This is an ongoing problem and a
concern at all levels of N5F management.
2. Cash Position Forecasting
When designing a cash position forecasting model it is only logical
to pattern it after the actual process. The true test of the validity of a
forecast model is its accuracy. In addition, it is desirable, in the interest
of human understanding and acceptance, to closely reflect the actual flow
of cash. All of the existing cash forecasting models which were reviewed
were similar and fairly representative of NSF operations.
The NSF cash equation is patterned on simple accounting:
end-of-period cash being equal to the beginning cash balance + collections
- expenditures + appropriations +/- any transfers. Collections, or current
year sales, are made up of several accounts (customers orders, unfilled
customer orders, changes in unfilled customer orders, sales, etc.)
combining in patterns predicted by the ICPs. These patterns are based on
historical and/or projected demand, escalation changes, and program
changes such as operational tempo, outfitting schedules, and customer
budgets.
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Expenditures are forecast at the NAV5UP level and are derived
principally from the expected obligation program, historical expenditure
rates (adjusted for predicted trends), financial lead times, and projected
new program starts (i.e., DLRs or Long Lead Time Material). Transfers and
appropriations are planned inputs but depend heavily on political vagaries
and factors well beyond the control of the N5F managers. These factors
will each be discussed separately in the following sections. The most
detailed presentation of the various cash equation elements and their
uses was found in the 1976 study conducted by Control Analysis
Corporation which yielded the "Navy Stock Fund Financial Forecasting
Model". Appendix A is an excerpt from that study and displays the 15
accounts and transactions used by that model,
a. Demand Forecasting
All the forecast models reviewed started with the forecast
demand as the critical input for the collection side of the cash equation.
Both NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT N5F managers stated that the sales and
collections predictions, and therefore the demand forecasting, were
"pretty good". Demand forecasting begins with a forecast of customer
orders based on historical demand and program requirements. These
forecasts are then used to determine the end of period inventory and
on-order requirements necessary to support the level of customer orders
anticipated during the next fiscal year.
The entire demand forecasting process is quite involved and has
received a great deal of attention and analysis. The problem of demand
forecasting is compounded by the need to look at both provisioning for
new systems and replenishment for existing systems. Within each of
75
these categories the sub-categories of wholesale and resale must be
considered Also, both consumables and repairables must be analyzed.
DODINST 4140.42 and NAV5UPN0TE 4441 (15 July 1983) address
requirements determination and range and depth of support, respectively.
The ICPs are tasked with conducting this forecasting effort and
integrating it with their inventory control programs.
The Navy inventory models compute procurement and repair
levels for individual items of supply. These tasks are accomplished
through a complex group of computer programs, collectively known as the
Uniform Inventory Control Program (U1CP). The UICP programs collect and
manipulate data; forecast demand, lead times, repair times, and
variances; and compute procurement and repair levels. These outputs are
driven by mobilization and lead time requirements, safety levels and
operating levels of supply, or economic order quantities
[Ref. 34: p. 3-24], ICP budget analysts look at recurring demand,
historical demand, survival time, and administrative and production lead
times in generating their demand forecasts.
Administrative lead time (ALT) is "the time it takes to award a
contract, measured from the time the need for procurement is initially
established." [Ref. 35: p. 3 1 ] Production Lead Time (PLT) is "the expected
span of time between the date of the award of the procurement and the
aggregate average time of first receipt at all stock points in the
distribution system." [Ref. 35: p. 32] The first receipt refers to the first
"significant" delivery made to a stock point. Together the ALT and PLT
comprise what is called the Procurement lead time. Financial lead time,
mentioned before, is actually PLT plus a follow-on period of time from
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receipt of the material to the expenditure registered when the bill is
paid. Historical data bases are maintained at the ICPs for 5 years.
Various default values, ranging from 5-7 quarters, are used if no lead
time history is available. Manual adjustments by the inventory manager
are possible to allow for actual delivery experience, contractual delivery
schedules, or written contractor-furnished estimates. These can be
entered into the data base and used at the item manager's discretion.
When contractor estimates are used, each ICP then adds a receipt and
processing time ( 1 3 days at 5PCC, one month at ASO).
5PCC employs industry standards for PLT generated by NAV5EA
Shipbuilding Support Office (NAVSHIPSO) which uses market indicators
for monitoring fluctuations in lead times. They conduct surveys on
manufacturing lead times and production rates to identify industry
standards, particularly for critical items, long lead time items, sole
source, foreign source and short supply items. [Ref. 35: p. 35]
Budget requirements are calculated by ICP budget analysts who
attempt to validate the planned requirements. They employ "levels"
programs to read the historical demand data, exponentially smooth the
observed quarterly demand, and, with the aid of Cyclic Levels and
Forecasting (CLF) data sheets, they weight the entries to compute their
requirements estimates. (ASO uses equal weights while 5PCC uses higher
weights for the more recent entries). Once again, the item manager is
allowed a judgement input based on his best guess to either adjust or
completely override the program. Inventory costs for items are based on
the last buy recorded.
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With over 540,000 Navy managed items in the N5F inventory the
item managers cannot conduct this type of review for each line item.
Instead, they set parameters and tolerance thresholds. If a level
prediction falls outside the thresholds, the item manager notes the item,
conducts the review and makes any necessary adjustments.
Significant work has been done in demand forecasting by all
services. Time series vs. causal forecasting methods have been
researched for determining better Economic Order Quantity models [Ref.
36: p. 20]. Non-parametric forecasting models have been reviewed in an
effort to fine tune inventory control programs such as the Aviation Afloat
& Ashore Allowance Analyzer (5A) wholesale inventory analyzer at A50
and the Ships Supply Support Study inventory simulator at SPCC. These
studies have used actual historical data from Transaction Item Reporting
(TIR) files, 7 years worth at SPCC and 5 years worth at A50. [Ref. 37: p.
7]. Estimations of shortage costs, a major factor in any EOQ model have
been conducted looking at time/essentiality weightings with long term
intentions to include these factors in the resystemization improvements
for data processing within the N5F [Ref. 38: pp. iii-iv]. Statistical
analysts, using tools such as histograms, chi-square tests, and mean
squared error measurements, have determined that a Bernoulli -
Exponential distribution has the best relative fit for lead time demand
[Ref. 39: p. ii]. The above are just a few of the areas being investigated
in the ongoing effort to fine tune the demand forecasting process. These
processes will no doubt improve as these efforts continue.
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b. Collections
The NSF responds to funded requisitions from customers called
customer orders. When the requested material is issued and a
corresponding transfer of funds is registered, a sale has been made. For
DOD customers using the intra/interfund transfer system, this sale
represents an immediate cash collection. For customers outside of DOD,
the collection usually lags for a brief period as an accounts receivable for
the NSF. When the requested item is not available, an unfilled customer
order exists until the order is filled. This unfilled customer orders
account is carried over each year while the sales account is closed out at
the end of each Fiscal Year.
Through the course of the year, the NSF accumulates collections
from sales and liquidating the unfilled customer orders. Final collections
equals the sales plus any decrease in the unfilled customer orders or
minus any increase in unfilled customer orders.
Most stock fund budget and management reports deal with the
term "customer orders" while the term "collections" is used for cash
transactions and forecasts. Budget Project (BP) sales are derived from
the ICP's demand forecasted customer orders. They are then aggregated
to the total NSF level and adjusted for expected monthly changes in
accounts receivable and special collections (i.e. transfers from 0&M,N) to
produce a forecast of monthly NSF collections. This rather mechanical
prediction, based primarily on the demand forecast, represents one side
of the cash equation and is taken at face value by NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT
NSF managers. As was seen in Table 8, the collections predictions for
FY84 and FY85 were 5% and 9% of actual collections, respectively.
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c. Obligations
The next step in developing a forecast model is to generate NSF
obligational requirements by comparing the inventory assets with the
forecasted demand. This is carried out through the semi-annual
"stratification" process. Stratification is really nothing more than
matching the on-hand and predicted inventory with the predicted
requirements, by line item. This matching takes place twice a year, on 3
1
March and 30 September. Several times each year, during ICP on-site
reviews with all interested parties (NAVSUP, NAVCOMPT, NAVAIR,
NAVSEA, etc.), 150 - 175 items are reviewed in an effort to audit what
the analysts have done. A Supply Demand Review (SDR) program is run
weekly for consumables and monthly for repairables. This program
yields a recommended procurement order of the deficit up to the reorder
level, plus an Economic Order Quantity. These buying orders are actually
predicted obligations. Once again, a fundamental factor is derived at the
ICP level from the demand forecast. As mentioned before, the ICPs
manage to an Orders/Obligation deviation, so they take great care to
predict these figures as accurately as possible.
Obligations are directly controlled by the item managers and
therefore offer some form of control. This control is reflected in the
periodic reviews and adjustments which are made to obligations during
the budget cycle. A problem arises in the use of the outlay target as the
management goal. Unfortunately, the outlay target is not computed using
the obligations figure. This control is therefore not considered in
measuring success at the NAVSUP and NAVCOMPT level. Commodore D.W.
McKinnon, Vice Commander of the Navy Supply Systems Command wrote:
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The flexibility within the NSF budget process permits obligation
forecast adjustments as conditions change (e.g. sales, program changes,
etc.) and this represents the major difference against the "official"
plan. Outlays, on the other hand, are not as susceptible to management
control since they are driven in large part by financial lead times. [Ref.
40]
Two other problem areas have been noted concerning obligations
estimates. First, with the trend towards competition, a number of
existing contracts have been reviewed and some obligations have been
"re-definitized" at a lower level. This effort has resulted in a lower than
projected obligation rate. As will be seen in the next section, this
translates into a lower expenditure rate, which in turn yields an excess
of cash. This "de-obligation" of funds is being tracked and future
forecasts are, to a degree, being adjusted.
The second problem area involves seasonal phasing of the
obligation distribution throughout the year in order to more accurately
reflect the real world. Projections in the past have used straight-line
estimates ( 1 / 1 2th of annual obligations per month) for the entire year
and quarterly obligation patterns have been ignored. Both "de-obligations"
and obligation phasing will be discussed further in Chapter V.
d. Expenditures
The final major component of the cash equation is the
expenditures, or actual outflows of "cash", from the NSF. These
expenditures are made up of payments to contractors for procured Navy
managed wholesale material as well as transfers to DLA and other DOD
stock funds for purchase of their retail material. The expenditure
forecast is made up of two primary parts: 1 ) forecast obligations; and 2)
financial lead time (FLT). FLT is the time between the obligation and the
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actual expenditure and is therefore a critical element in forecasting
expenditures. If one accepts the validity of FLT, then the expenditure
forecast is a reflection of the obligation forecast, delayed by one FLT.
The accuracy of all previous forecasts leading up to the obligations is
therefore of extreme importance.
There is no direct control over expenditures. Once an obligation
has been recorded, an expenditure will follow. As a result, expenditure
rates tend to be fairly constant over time. The critical question is
therefore, "When will the bill be paid?" It is logical to assume that the
obligation pattern will be reflected in the expenditure rate, as described
above. Time no doubt dampens this relation so that a Budget Project with
a long FLT would not show as strong a relation as one with a short FLT. If
the timing of the "bubble", the reflection of a concentrated period of
obligations, is missed by two weeks in September, the forecast for the
whole year would be in error by a like amount with no time to correct
itself.
This raises the question "How accurate are the FLT estimates?"
The major component of FLT is the Production lead time (PLT). FLTs have
been increasing over the past few years. As a result of FY84's excessive
end-of-period cash balance, NAV5UP lengthened their estimates of FLTs
in several BPs: BP 14 from 12.0 to 16.1 months, BP34 from 16.5 to 16.7
months, and BP81 from 17.0 to 20.6 months [Ref. 41: p. 41 The natural
assumption was that the PLTs, unique to each contractor, were increasing
and driving the overall increase in FLTs. Through a consensus of item
manager inputs, it was determined that PLTs were in fact holding steady.
This meant that the problem was either on the administration and
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handling side or hidden within the outstanding obligations prediction.
Both of these areas will be discussed later. It should be noted that four
years ago the FLTs shortened which resulted in the "cash crisis of '82",
evidence of the cyclic nature of FLTs.
If a model is constructed in a pure fashion, the FLT is an input
based on historical data and adjusted for various trends and factors just
as the other elements of the cash equation are. Virtually every factor
which affects the forecast manifests itself in the FLT in one way or
another. Competition, BOSS, longer PLT, and many of the other factors
mentioned in the next section impact on the accuracy of FLT predictions.
Additionally, different models are generated in slightly different ways
which significantly impact on the FLT validity. These models, and the
accuracy of the FLT estimates will be discussed in a later section.
The following section identifies many of the various factors
that affect the forecasting elements discussed so far. Though the basic
cash equation is, on the surface, simple, these factors make the N5F
managers' task of forecasting stock fund cash extremely difficult.
3. Factors Affecting Forecasts
There are a number of factors which affect each other as well as
impact the ultimate cash position. These have been grouped into the
following six categories for the purpose of this discussion:
a. Commercial Sector Economic Conditions
b. Federal Policy and Congressional Direction
c. DOD and Navy Policy
d. N5F Structure Changes
e. Accounting and Processing
f. Other
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Each of these areas will be discussed, with specific examples of
the impact of the various factors which make up the categories.
Additionally, a brief review of trends in some of the factors will be
offered. Factors unique to the Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) will be
addressed in the next section.
a. Commercial Sector Economic Conditions
This area is one of the most global in nature yet one of the
hardest to quantify. The basic premise is that when the national economy
is good, the commercial sector is less responsive to the Federal
government. When sufficient private business is available, with no due
dates or penalties, firms may stretch out their government contracts in
order to devoted more effort to their private customers. This creates the
situation where the Federal government is financing the firm's private
sector business growth and operations. The direct impact on the N5F is
manifested in longer production lead times which cause an equal
expansion in financial lead times. Hence, these events cause an excess of
cash due to delayed expenditures. The real danger in this situation is that
it can reverse itself very rapidly and, if the N5F manager is not tuned to
the economic environment, the PLT and FLT could begin decreasing. The
N5F could be susceptible for a cash out condition if the trend is not
caught in time. Given a rapid and severe enough shift, it is possible that
nothing short of an injection of cash could salvage the solvency of the
N5F. In BPs where lead times approach two years there is little near
term control which can be exercised to prevent such a problem. One
possible dampening action may be contracting for specific delivery
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schedules and locking in a PLT. With a known quantity for PLT, the FLT
variable is significantly stabilized.
b. Federal Policy and Congressional Direction
Changes in policy and direction at the Federal and Congressional
levels present a double problem due to their far reaching scope and
potential to occur long after the forecasting and pricing controls can
correct for them. Several recent examples of such situations highlight
the affect of these changes.
The Prompt Payment Act was designed to take advantage of any
discounts available for early payment of bills and to optimize the use of
Treasury cash by not paying bills early. These changes have been made
and the government is now saving money that previously financed private
industry operations. A negative impact occurred when the Navy slowed
payments for a three week period to adhere to the regulation. The Navy
had previously paid bills as they were received. By stretching these
payments to 30 days, a three week lag in expenditures produced an excess
of cash. $30 million of expenditures are identified as having slid from
FY84 to FY85 due to the slow down to 30 days [Ref. 41: p. 21
Circular A-76 established competition as a watchword in
procurement. The effort and attention given to ensuring competition has
resulted in a slow down of both obligations (in the form of contracts) and
expenditures. This slow down, without a similar decline in collections
has invalidated projections and resulted once again in a cash excess.
General budgetary actions by Congress have potential for major
impact on N5F cash in two ways. First, these actions tend to be far
reaching in scope and address large dollar amounts. Secondly they can
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occur very close to or during the execution year, long after any
management controls are left. An example would be the reduction of
customer budgets (a cut in 0&M,N) which necessitates an alteration of the
pricing structure to balance to the new customer budgets. This action
then negates the careful planning of the previous season in establishing
prices which enabled the N5F to meet its required 1 1-day operating cash
objective. Another case to consider is Congressional appropriations to
Prepositioned Wartime Reserves or Inventory Augmentation. These funds
are obligated and expended without offsetting collections. The net effect
on cash is not a problem since the appropriations were unplanned income.
However, the outlay target, used to measure NSF managers performance,
is now skewed to the increased expenditure resulting in a higher outlay
figure. The N5F managers have no control over these expenditures and
therefore should not be judged against something they cannot change or
influence.
Virtually every action of Congress dealing with the Navy
impacts on the NSF cash. The "600 ship Navy" emphasis resulted in major
expansion of the volume of the NSF. It is extremely difficult to attempt
to quantify the impact of legislation such as the recent Gramm-Rudman
Act or the proposal to spread naval bases throughout the U.S. These
actions cannot be predicted, especially two years ahead of time. The best
that the NSF managers can do is to have a model and a system which are
attuned to these potential changes. These models must be adjustable for
both trial runs, to assess the impact of these changes, and for actual
altering of the forecasts as soon as the changes have been confirmed.
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c. DOD and Navy Policy
SECDEF procurement and pricing initiatives reflect the
competition "hysteria" and media attention that has been so prevalent in
recent years. The results have been a slow down of obligations through
delays on the bidding process as well as the review of existing contracts
and the "re-definitization" of outstanding obligations at lower prices.
The impact of such initiatives can be seen in the "Buy Our
Spares Smart" (BOSS) program. Many contracts for spare parts have been
modified and "re-definitized" at lower rates. FY82 and FY83 contract
reviews yielded savings of $100 million at ASO and $147 million at SPCC.
The result was a $247 million reduction in FY84 outlays [Ref. 41: p. 23.
The validation of outstanding obligations (Obs Val) program has
been ongoing at the ICP level for some time. Its purpose is to identify
cancelled or false obligations. With the importance of the projected
outstanding obligations to the forecasting process this effort has become
increasingly critical. COMNAVSUP letter, dated 7 Mar 85, emphasized the
need for continued vigilance in this area and lays out the reporting
requirements. Table 9 shows the results of the FY83 and FY84 Obligations
Validation program at SPCC [Ref. 42]
d. NSF Structure Changes
This category refers to changes in NSF operations and programs
which impact on the cash flow and position. One of the most major
changes in recent history is the addition of Depot Level Repairables
(DLRs) to the NSF. The Aviation DLRs (AVDLRs, BP85) have been in the NSF
for less than a year but the Non-AVDLRs (BP81 ) have been monitored for
over 3 years. During this time there have been constant increases in
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FLT within BP81 which have made predicted expenditures for this BP
greater than those actually experienced.
TABLE 9
SPCC OBLIGATION VALIDATION SCOPE OF OPERATIONS, FY83, FY84
(Dollars in $000)
EYS2 EYM
Contracts Reviewed 6,166 10,595
Value of Contracts Reviewed $740,603 $2,435,500
Value of Unliquidated Obligations $283,061 $1,625,792
Funds Released for Additional Reguirements $6,269 $63,200
An additional area of concern is the impact of the capitalization
of AVDLR material which will begin in April 1986. There is a tendency
for NSF analysts to inflate expenditure estimates in order to create a
cash cushion to cover for this uncertainty. The FLT estimates are
therefore probably conservatively low.
The uncertainty problem is not restricted to the expenditure
side of the cash equation. Sales predictions are also a factor which must
be considered. These problems have been identified and actions are
planned to counter their affects. The Deputy Commander for Financial
Management/Comptroller related in his Memorandum for the Record, dated
20 Apr 85:
. . . that if NSF cash infusions are required as a result of AVDLR sales
decline, it would come from 0&M,N customer account. 0P-921 was
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directed to maintain proper balance between cash and customer
accounts relative to AVDLR sales. [Ref. 29]
Another structure issue is the migration of high volume, fast
moving item management to DLA. This Consumable Item Transfer (CIT),
as discussed earlier, results in expenditures by the NSF to buy material
for which it will never see collections. DLA, on the other hand, obtains a
windfall excess of cash. ASO alone predicted a $25.2 million drop in
obligations and a $36.6 million drop in customer orders from scheduled
transfers of 35,000 items to DLA management in FY 85 [Ref. 43: p. VI -A].
Unless these transfers are carefully forecasted, planned, and financed the
impact on NSF cash could be disastrous. Again, this problem has been
identified and there is a temporary freeze on CITs until an equitable
system of financing can be found. Furthermore the Navy will not resume
the CIT program without first running it through the proper channels.
NAVCOMPT [NCBl must approve the restart of item transfers to DLA. [Ref.
44]
The introduction of Special Accounting Class (SAC) 207 shios to
the NSF has compunded problems of missed reporting deadlines and
Centrally Managed Accounts. These will be addressed further in Chapter
V.
A major change to the NSF involved the establishment of BP23,
Ships Overhaul Material. Through this Budget Project the NSF finances
the lead time for these long lead time items. The problem of uncertainty
surfaced again when the FY84 expenditures were $ 1 09 million less than
projected. BP23 is still a relatively new program and the original
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estimates called for 57% of the obligations to be expended within one
year of obligation. In reality, the rate was only 15%. There was no
historical data within the NSF and the cause was attributed again to
expanding lead times. [Ref. 40: p.2] Further, BP23 is expected to be a
continuing problem [Ref. 41: p. 2].
e. Accounting and Processing
Different BPs are susceptible to different errors. For instance,
short lead time BPs (like BP28 and BP38) are more susceptible to billing
and handling errors. It is not uncommon for the processing of collections
or disbursements to be subject to the vagaries of data processing and its
unpredictable problems. If a bill is delayed for 3 weeks due to
mishandling or improper addressing and the FLT is only 1 month, the
percentage impact on the cash position cause by not having received that
bill is significantly greater than if the FLT was 20 months. The
expenditure in the first case would have been expected within the 1
month window and the delay represents a 75% error in timing. The latter
case results in less than a 4% timing error.
Another area of concern is the human factor; excessive
workload, and simple human error. The latter will never be completely
eliminated and must be considered at least as a random variable.
Administrative policies of other organizations, i.e., DLA,
directly affect the NSF. For example, a delay in processing fuel bills,
whether consciously decided or not, would impact the NSF expenditures.




There are many other factors which should be considered in
establishing a forecast for N5F cash. Two, which were noted in various
sources, include: 1 ) phasing of obligational patterns; and 2) the
complexity of new weapons systems. Prior to the review of FY84 excess
cash problems, it was common to assume a linear obligation pattern,
where 1/12th of the total obligations would be registered each month.
Table 10 shows that a full 48% of the obligations for 5PCC occurred in
the 4th quarter [Ref. 45: p. 1 ]. While this is partially credited as a one
time occurrence, it is true that the obligation rates are a function of
TABLE 10 .
5PCC OBLIGATION PATTERNS FY82-84
($ in millions )
FY82 %. FY83 %. FY84 %.
1st Quarter $234 18 $ 147 10 $ 161 1 1
2nd Quarter 283 21 300 21 235 !6
3rd Quarter 191 14 300 21 243 17
4th Quarter £22 42 668 4£ 811 55.
Total Year 1,330 100 1,415 100 1,450 100
the fiscal year quarter. 0&M,N money is available via an annual
appropriation. When the 4th quarter arrives, the tendency is to "use it or
lose it." This gives rise to situations such as ordering 1000 softballs
when only 10 are required. NAVCOMPT's new model includes phased
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obligation estimates and should produce more accurate predictions than
previous models.
Increasing weapons system complexity is another factor which
is difficult to pin down. Newer systems contracts generally consist of
very high dollar values and a proportionately larger share of the N5F
incurred obligations. In the past, SPCC's expenditure estimates were
based on an average PLT and percentage split for both the provisioning
(new systems) and replenishment. In actuality the numbers were very
different. Provisioning was found to account for 45% of the obligations
vice the 26% previously used and the lead times for the complex systems
averaged 2 1 months vice the previous average of 1 3 to 1 6 months. [Ref. 4 !
:
P. 31
4. DLR Unique Factors
In addition to the above, certain factors affecting forecasts are
unique to the DLR Budget Projects, BP8I and BP85. These factors make
the forecasting problem more complicated and account, to some degree,
for the uncertainty observed to date.
The lack of N5F historical data bases for DLRs is a fundamental
problem for the forecaster. For AVDLRs, the suggestion has been made to
use data from the 2R account, the Aviation Procurement Navy (APN)
appropriation, to aid in the prediction process. This would provide a data
base to expand from and should eliminate some of the uncertainty.
Another general factor which was mentioned before is the tendency
to be overconservative in estimating expenditures to ensure solvency, the
N5F managers' primary concern. BP85 has the potential of varying by
$IOO's of millions which could drive the NSF into a negative cash
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position. The conservative tendency must therefore be carefully
considered when arriving at a forecast for DLR outlays. A final
complicating factor is the split nature of these BPs. Each has a
procurement and a repair side which must be accounted for and predicted.
Some specific factors include: 1 ) depot washout rate; 2) carcass
loss rate; 3) workload standards; and 4) potential migration of rework of
components into the organic sector.
Depot washout rate is the rate at which components are found to be
unrepairable once they are inducted for maintenance. Carcass losses are
losses incurred between shipment and receipt at the depot. These losses
can be either physical losses or simply administrative errors in shipping
documents. Using the past 3 years data, the Non-AVDLR carcass loss rate
is approximately 3%. No rate has been established or is currently being
used for AVDLRs [Ref. 46].
Workload standards (the number of man-hours required to fix 2
particular component) is another factor in determining a depot level
repair facility's PLT for a particular item. As the migration of comDonent
rework to the organic sector develops, N5F financing of this effort will
be affected and forecasts must be adjusted accordingly.
To summarize, many factors must be considered during the cash
forecasting process. The uncertainty and difficulty in quantifying many
of these factors contribute to the inherent forecasting problems. The
need still exists to improve and "fine tune" the current forecasting
systems. The next section will review several forecasting models in an




Three forecasting models were reviewed. Two of the models are
currently in use, one by NAV5UP and the other by NAVCOMPT. The third
model was the result of a contracted study completed in 1976 by Control
Analysis Corporation, entitled "Navy Stock Fund Financial Forecasting
Model." Each model takes the same basic approach as discussed earlier.
The end-of-period cash balance is computed from the beginning cash
balance by adding any appropriated funding and collections, subtracting
disbursements (expenditures), and adjusting for any transfers of cash to
or from the fund. This ending balance is then split into the three
programs of operations, inventory augmentation, and mobilization stock
(Pre-positioned War Reserve). The primary differences in the two current
models are the calculation and use of financial lead times and the
obligations and expenditure patterns assumed,
a. NAV5UP Model
The cash forecasting model used by N5F managers at NAVSUP is
a mechanization of a previous manual system. This system plotted actual
and projected obligations and expenditures on a graph with dollars on the
vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis as shown in Figure 4-1.
These graphs were prepared for each Budget Project and were used as the
primary tool in NAVSUP cash forecasting. Now that the model has been
computerized, this collection and plotting exercise is more timely and
possibly more accurate due to the mathematical derivation vice physical
plotting of the obligation and expenditure lines. The errors associated
with picking a point off a graph have been removed.
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Appendix B is a sample output from the NAV5UP model along with the











BPs 14,34, & 81
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1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH
FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 88
Figure 4- 1 NAV5UP Expenditure Forecasting
Source: NAV5UP 60 Navy Stock Fund Presentation, April 1985
following discussion. Column headings will be listed in parentheses. The
"collection" side of the cash equation is taken directly from the ICP
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estimates for each BP, summed to a total value. This value is then
adjusted for BP25 (the NAVSUP managed clearance account used for fuel
reclamation and special transactions such as litigations) and any changes
to the total Accounts Receivable. The ICP inputs are reviewed for
consistency with historical demand data, escalation changes, and any
program changes in operational tempo, customer budgets, and outfitting
schedules. These predictions are input directly into customer orders
(ORDERS) and collections (SALES).
The "expenditure" side of the equation begins with the obligation
program which is made up of existing outstanding obligations (Obligations
Brought Forward (OBS BF)) and the projected future obligations
(Obligations, Current Period (OBS CP)). These inputs are also derived for
each BP from the ICP demand projections and are adjusted in the same
manner as the collections. Projections for new program starts and
changes in the NSF structure are taken into consideration as factors
affecting the obligation program. The historical expenditure rate is then
estimated and adjusted for predicted trends.
This estimated expenditure rate is the basis for the primary
difference in the NAVSUP and NAVCOMPT models. NAVSUP assumes a
smooth, nearly linear expenditure rate and extrapolates the expenditures
based on that rate, adjusted for trends. FLT is then taken as the
difference between the obligation and expenditure lines at any given
dollar level as shown in Figure 4-1. FLT is therefore an output of this
model rather than an input based on historical data. The NSF managers
review the expenditure (EXPEND) and the FLT for reasonableness
(comparing FLT with the average value for the last 12 months), however
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the end-of-period cash balance is based on the extrapolated expenditure
line. Once this expenditure level is established, the following formulas
are used to compute an FLT for each BP:
If the historical Fl T has been > 1? months -
EXPEND = 12/FLT*(OBSBP)
(12/FLT represents the portion of existing outstanding obligations
which will be expended in the next 12 months.)
This can be re-written to solve for the FLT:
FLT = (12 *(OBSBF))/ EXPEND
If historical FLT is < 12 months the formula is more complicated:
EXPEND = (0B5 BF) + ( 1 - (FLT/ 1 2)) * (OB5 CP)
(This case assumes that all existing outstanding obligations will
become expenditures in one FLT and the expenditures generated during
the remainder of the 12 month's will be (1 -(FLT/ 12)) times the
projected obligations for the year.)
Solving for FLT yields :
FLT = 1 2 * ( 1 - ((EXPEND - 0B5 BF)/OBS CP))
The estimated expenditure is therefore derived without taking into
account any direct correlation to the pattern of obligations which give
rise to the expenditures.
The final steps calculate OUTLAYS as EXPEND less SALES and
apply the corrections for appropriations (APPROP) and transfers (XFER5)
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to yield obligations carried forward into the next year (OBS CF) and the
end-of-period cash balance carried forward (CASH CF).
b. NAVCOMPT Model
NAVCOMPT's cash position forecasting model is closely
integrated with their pricing mechanism and is a modified version of
NAVSUP's model with an expanded historical data base . The same basic
cash equation and approach are used in both. The difference in the two
models centers on the prediction of the expenditures and the phasing of
obligations. As stated above, NAV5UP uses a linear extrapolation of the
historical expenditure line to predict the future level of expenditure.
NAVCOMPT, on the other hand, generates the expenditure estimates based
on the existing and predicted obligations and the actual historical FLTs.
Monthly obligation patterns and rates are assumed to remain
constant from year to year (i.e., if in the past an average of 5% of the
total was obligated in the first month then 5% is predicted for the first
month this year). These patterns are calculated using a 3 year average
for each Budget Project and separately for rework and procurement
within the DLR BPs. This obligation pattern is reflected in the
expenditure rates, offset by one FLT, and graphically results in a phased
expenditure line paralleling the obligation line. This is in fact nearly the
case in Figure 4-1 where the budgeted expenditure line would represent
NAVCOMPT's estimate. While time and the vast numbers of obligations
will most likely dampen the direct relation of the obligation rate to the
expenditure rate, it is reasonable to assume that this pattern will be
reflected to some degree. Given the magnitude of the funds involved, and
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the necessary tight tolerances of any prediction model, the more accurate
the pattern prediction, the better.
Appendix C is a sample of the NAVCOMPT model output for BP34
which may be referred to during the following discussion. The first step
in determining the expenditure estimate is to compute the historical FLT.
This is done by noting the current unliquidated obligations balance and
working backwards in the cumulative obligations table until an equal
amount has been accounted for as illustrated in Figure 4-2. The
difference between that point in time and the current month is the FLT.
This method assumes that any obligations prior to that date have been
expended. The historical FLTs are listed in tabular form for each month.
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Figure 4-2 NAVCOMPT FLT Determination
The next step is to project future expenditures based on
predicted FLTs. To accomplish this the obligations are projected using
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the historical phasing pattern and an FLT is predicted based on trends,
program developments, and judgement. All the factors mentioned in the
previous section should play a part in this FLT prediction. The projected
expenditures are then generated by applying the predicted FLT to the
projected obligations. Outlays and end-of-period cash can then be
calculated.
NAVCOMPT's model has been active since June 1985 and was
utilized for the first time for FY86 projections. Current estimates of
excess cash for FY87 (cash in excess of the 1 1-day operating cash
objective) are on the order of $930 million using NAVCOMPT's model and
$560 million using NAVSUP's model. This significant difference is a
function of the method used to project expenditures and the effect of
different human judgemental inputs.
One common problem with both models is the lack of
documentation. NAVCOMPT's model was generated by one individual using
a standard Lotus™ spreadsheet and a personal computer. No
documentation exists at present for this model. NAVSUP's model has been
active for over two years and the only documentation which was availaDle
to the authors consisted of a printout of the formulas for the output,
c. 1 976 N5F Financial Forecasting Model
This model incorporates the benefits of the other two models
and provides additional historical and prediction data for N5F managers to
predict and control NSF cash flows. The 1976 Control Analysis
Corporation (CAC) study provides in-depth documentation on the complex
financial and inventory relations within the NSF. Monthly predictions are
constructed for each BP and are projected 1 2 months into the future. A
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moving 12 month data base is automatically maintained. Several files are
preserved which allow easy data control and access. A History File holds
the last five years' actual monthly values for a dozen different accounts
at the BP and NSF level. The Prediction File stores up to 23 months of
forecast values. The Parameter File holds the various statistics and
budget plans for computations [Ref. 47: p. 9]. Additional features include
the Forecast Error/Exception Report which compares current transaction
outputs with the past 12 months of data. By reviewing this file, N5F
managers would be able to quickly detect errors or significant changes in
trends. The FLT Monitor Report is a "warning device that indicates when
key statistics in the Parameter File require updating." [Ref. 47: p. 11].
Both production runs and experimental runs can be conducted, allowing
sensitivity analysis of new project inputs or program changes.
Another major improvement is that the FLTs are presented as
statistical distributions and the outputs are given as a range, a
confidence interval of sorts, rather than single numbers. Inclusion of this
confidence interval would give the N5F managers a feel for the accuracy
of their forecasts.
All three of the above models follow the same basic format.
NAVCOMPT's model is an improved version of NAVSUP's model. However,
the additional aspects of error detection, statistically distributed data,
and confidence interval outputs provided by the 1976 N5F Forecasting
Model may make this a more preferred model.
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G. PRICING AND BUDGETING
1. Pricing
Pricing has been identified as the primary control mechanism for
N5F cash management. Pricing and budgeting for the NSF are interrelated
in a complex process affected by customer budgets, the economy,
individual item life cycles, and the 1 1-day required cash objective. This
section will review the pricing and budgeting process to show the
interelationships, the timing limitations, and the level of control on
short-term cash within the NSF.
There are three primary objectives of the NSF pricing process:
1. Attain an eleven day cash balance,
2. Balance the NSF cash budgets with customer budgets,
3. Retain Total Obligational Authority (TOA) in the Navy during the
budget decision process (maintaining "program").
These objectives are not only incompatible but are mutually exclusive at
certain times in the budget process. NSF pricing is conducted annually
and prices are kept stable for one year in accordance with the OSD
Price/Rate Stabilization policy. This effectively protects the customer
from price fluctuations which could impact the ability to purchase the
entire budgeted "program". These prices, once set, can only be changed in
rare instances, such as a new price definitization or a public relations
adjustment (these exceptions will be discussed later), and are not
available to balance cash in the short-term. Standard prices are
computed using a historically based replacement cost adjusted by a
series of surcharges which cover the cost of doing business and
accomplish the balancing of customer budgets and the NSF budgets.
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The process begins at the ICP level where each Navy Stock
Number (N5N) item is reviewed and a base price is established. For both
consumable and repairable items which have been recently procured
(within the last 12 months), the most recent purchase price is used as the
base price. For those items which have not been recently procured, the
last purchase price is adjusted for inflation which has occurred since it's
procurement by applying an 05D established inflation factor to achieve
the new base price. This process takes place each year and provides the
"platform" for the computation of standard prices.
The next step is to apply surcharges to the base price. There are
three surcharges which apply: 1 ) Navy; 2) Inventory Management; and 3)
Price Stabilization. A summary of surcharges used for FY86 are included
in Table 1 1. The Navy surcharge covers the cost of doing business and is
comprised of inventory losses, transportation, and obsolescence.
inventory losses are based on historical rates for pilfered,
mishandled, and damaged inventory derived from the Financial inventory
Report (FIR).
The NSF pays for transportation costs which are incurred upon
initial shipment of newly procured inventory to Navy stock points and any
subsequent redistribution of inventory. This data is compiled from
information included in the Consolidated Expenditure Reporting System
(CERPS).
Obsolescence refers to the material that is no longer useable
due to expiration of shelf-life, technological advances, or phase-outs of
support requirements. The obsolescence charge is calculated from data
taken from the FIR. Note that the obsolescence charge for DLRs is
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significantly less than that for consumables due to the repeated use and
repair of the former.
The above Navy surcharge elements are all based on historical
data and are expressed as a percentage of the replacement price. These
TABLE
SURCHARGES APPLIED IN FY86 N5F PRIG
SPCC ASO



















Surcharge 10.5% 7.9% 6.2% 2.9%
Price Stabilization
Surcharge -1.595 -1.9% 13.1% 1.1%
Total Surchage 222%. 12.0% 31.3% 3.0%
Source: "Navy Stock Fund Pricing: Math or Mirrors?"
elements are then added to the prices of Navy managed material in order
to recoup the costs incurred.
04
The Inventory Maintenance surcharge is applied to provide a
source of revenue which allows the N5F to finance the ongoing cost, or
"churn", of Navy managed items which results from changes in demand.
This charge also recoups the transportation, inventory loss, and
obsolescence costs of non-Navy managed material. Material managed by
other stock funds must be bought and sold by the NSF at standard prices
developed by the respective stock fund managers. The Navy's costs
incurred in handling this material is not considered in the other stock
funds' standard prices. The Inventory Maintenance surcharge provides for
the recoupment of these costs from the sale of Navy managed items.
The Price Stabilization surcharge is employed to balance the
customer budgets to the stock fund budgets. The new replacement orices,
adjusted for Navy and Inventory Maintenance surcharges are used by the
iCPs to establish an overall demand dollar value for the vear. This value
is compared to the previous year's value and a Price Stabilization
surcharge is calculated and applied to the new standard orices to achieve
the overall Fiscal Year to Fiscal Year price change built into the customer
budgets. When used to adjust to the 1 1-day cash balance, this new value
is compared to the value necessary to reach the new balance and the
surcharge is set accordingly.
Note that the Price Stabilization surcharge in FY86 was
negative, indicating an actual reduction in customer prices. The end
result is a standard price for each NSN which recovers the cost of doing
business and balances to the desired cash balance or the customer budget.
This process additionally maintains TOA within the Navy. These
surcharges are computed annually for each BP.
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For all consumable items there is only one price, the standard
price as calculated above. DLRs will have either a standard price or a net
price, depending on whether or not the customer turns in a carcass for
exchange. Figure 4-3 illustrates the development of a standard price for
* Establish Replacement Price
- Escalate to Current Year Base
- FY85 Replacement Price
* Apply Navy, Inventory Maintenance
and Price Stabilization Surcharge
- Navy Surcharge (6%)
Covers the cost of doing business:
Transportation, Losses,
and Obselescence
Inventory Maintenance Surcharge (7.9%)
Covers "churn" in maintaining
approved inventory levels
Price Stabilization Surcharge (-1.9%)
Balances annual N5F prices to customer
budgets





* Rounded to Standard Price of
$1 16.48
$117 .
Figure 4-3 FY86 Non-AVDLR Price Computation (Standard)
Source: "Navy Stock Fund Pricing: Math or Mirrors?"
a FY86 non-AVDLR which had a last procured price of $ 1 00 in FY84. The
$100 is indexed by the inflation factor to yield the replacement price for
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FY85. The Navy, Inventory Maintenance, and Price Stabilization
surcharges are then applied to yield the FY86 standard price of $ 1 1 7.
Figure 4-4 illustrates the similar but slightly more complicated
computation of net price for a DLR. The fundamental difference lies in
the concept that even though the established repair price is less than the
established replacement price, the dollar amount which must be recouped
from the Navy surcharge for the cost of doing business is the same. As
shown in Figure 4-4, in order to recoup the same $6 (6% of the $ 1 00
replacement price in the standard price scenario), a Navy surcharge of
1 9.3% is needed with the repair price of $31.10 ( .193 X $31.10 = $6). The
Inventory Maintenance surcharge need not be adjusted for the base
because it was generated as a percentage of the aggregate of all BP
transactions at the N5F level.
Two other surcharges enter into the computation of a net Drice:
1 ) Carcass Loss Factor, an adjustment for those carcasses that are either
never shipped, lost, or damaged in shipment; and 2) Depot Washout Rate,
which provides revenue to replace those carcasses that are returned but
are found to be Beyond Economic Repair (BER). These BER carcasses must
be surveyed and replaced with new procurements. The carcass loss rate
is based on historical rates and is currently 3% for Non-AVDLRs. No
carcass loss rate has been established for AVDLRs due to the lack of
historical data in this program. Therefore, the carcass loss rate is not
included in the AVDLR net price computation at this time. The Depot
Washout Rate is applied to both Aviation and Non- Aviation DLRs.
07
NSF prices therefore are "representative" of the item cost to the
Stock Fund and at the same time serve to provide inventory stability and a
balance with the customer budgets.
* Establish Repair Price $31.10
*Apply Net Price Factor X 1.40
- Depot Washout Factor ( 1 5.5%)
Covers cost of material not
surviving depot repair
- Carcass Loss Factor (3%)
Covers cost of retrograde losses
- Navy Surcharge ( 1 9.3% of Repair
Price which is equivalent to 6%
of Replacement Price)
- Inventory Maintenance Surcharge (7.99?)
- Price Stabilization Surcharge (-5.7%)
Balances annual NSF prices to customer
budget
- Computed Net Price $43.54
* Rounded to a Net Price of S44.QQ
Figure 4-4 FY86 Non-AVDLR Price Computation (Net)
Source: "Navy Stock Fund Pricing: Math or Mirrors?"
2. Budgeting Cycles
The NSF budget process begins with an estimate of the annual
demand based requirements. These requirements are balanced against
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on-hand and on-order assets through the stratification process to yield
the amount of obligational authority which will be requested to meet the
demand. Each budget is actually a "zero-based budget" generated from
specific annual requirements. N5F budgets are constructed initially by
the BP managers, collected and consolidated by the N5F managers at
NAV5UP, and then reviewed by NAVCOMPT and CNO. They are subsequently
submitted to OSD/OMB for approval.
The NSF managers develop budget inputs twice each year, once
for the input to the President's Budget and once for the Apportionment
review. Since each input includes estimates for three fiscal years, each
year is budgeted and re-budgeted seven separate times as shown in Figure
4-5 [Ref. 13: p. 30].
FY85 appears as one of the three fiscal years in three "Blue
Books", three "Brown Books" and the mid-year review in February of the
FY85 execution year. "Blue Book" refers to the Navy's input to the
President's budget and "Brown Book" refers to the initial apportionment
input to 05D.
3. Pricing Motivations
Timing defines the nature of a price adjustment. Since initial
budget estimates are made over two years prior to the execution year,
there is a great deal of uncertainty involved. The purpose of the pricing
computations differs as the budget year approaches. The following is an
excerpt from a NAVSUP presentation which addresses the history and
some of the political aspects of the pricing timetable:
Between June and September 84 we computed FY85 prices which
took effect in October 84. The FY85 budget was before Congress
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while the FY86 budget was working in Navy. NSF prices were coming
down due to BOSS and other economic impacts. The prices in the
FY85 budget on the Hill were set to match the NSF prices with the
customer accounts. . . . when we execute the FY85 budget, we will
pull the customer funds into the stock fund and produce excess cash.
Based on a projection of excess cash at the end of FY86, we set the
FY86 prices to attain the legally required 1 1 day operating stock
fund cash balance. [Ref. 48]
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Figure 4-5 NSF Budget Cycle
In the initial budget estimate (ie. summer '83 for FY85) the pricing
motivation is to achieve the 1 1-day cash balance. The Pricing
Stabilization surcharge is set to match the calculated 1 1-day value of
operations cash disbursements. These prices are then applied to the
forecasted customer demand to calculate the customer budgets for the
budget year, FY85 in this example. The next pricing adjustment will take
place the following year, in the summer of '84, when, as stated in the
excerpt above, the FY85 budget is in Congress. Prices for FY85 are now
balanced to the actual customer budgets to ensure that all budgeted
programs will be funded and that Navy TOA will be protected. In recent
history, this has resulted in an excess of cash.
The process begins at the same time for FY86. The ! I -day cash
balance is the objective for the FY86 pricing calculations in the summer
of "84. The price changes are made over a year before the beginning of the
execution year. Figure 4-6 illustrates some of the variations which took
place within the FY85 cash structure during the budget process [Ref 48].
As can be seen, significant dollar amounts, coupled with a wide range of
causes, indicates that pricing cannot be considered an effective control
mechanism in the present political and budgeting systems.
Pricing is changed once a year as noted above. There are other
times when prices are changed which can affect the short term cash
position to a small degree. Two examples are: 1 ) the "re-def initization"
of a price for a particular item; and 2) "public relations" price changes.
Re-def initization occurs when a procurement buy is made at a
significantly different price than initial estimates or previous prices, if
considered major enough, a BP manager may initiate a price change to the
master data file, which takes 120—150 days to execute.
The other example of potential short term cash control is the
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Figure 4-6 FY85 Cash History
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opinion are directed at a specific item price which is determined to be
"in error." BP managers, at their discretion, may adjust prices in these
instances with specific threshold limitations of ± $ 1 million/BP for
consumables and ±$2 million/BP for repairables. Even if all 10BP
managers employed this option the total impact on the N5F would be only
$12 million. When compared to cash excesses approaching $ 1 billion,
public relations price changes are insignificant.
The dollar impact of these price changes on total NSF cash is
minimal and therefore pricing cannot be considered a significant control
mechanism. Pricing is not a short term cash management tool.
4. Additional Pricing Problems
Aside from the major problem of not being an effective cash
management tool, pricing suffers from several other problems. Three
specific problems are: 1 ) currency of the base cost; 2) DLR repair orices
being higher than replacement prices; and 3) duration of acquisition 'ead
times.
a. Base Cost Currency
The currency of the base cost is critical in that, as explained
before, the entire price structure of a particular item is calculated on
this base. This problem doesn't exist for the high turnover, short lead
time material for which current procurement buy prices are available.
These items are considered "self-correcting" due to their short time
horizons. But for some of the large, slow moving items, like a ship's bull
mesh gears, which may have been procured 15-20 years ago, the problem
can be serious. The problem centers on the fact that the inflation factors
used to adjust the last purchase price to a "current" base cost
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(replacement cost) may yield a price which in no way resembles the
actual replacement cost of the item. Actual replacement cost would be
preferred, however, some items are no longer in production. These items
would be prohibitively expensive if a firm had to tool up and begin
production of the items. This expense would be even larger if there were
only a small number of items ordered. This base cost must be validated
for replacement price in order to more accurately estimate the standard
and net pricing and to accurately show the inventory value of the NSF
b. Repair/Replacement Relative Pricing
AVDLR pricing is complicated by having both standard and net
prices. This complication occassionally results in the situation where it
costs more for a component to be repaired than it does to buy a new one.
This is obviously an unacceptable condition, unrealistically driven by
aggregate surcharges. In an effort to minimize these occurrences, an
AVDLR screen has been established at ASO which identifies these
situations and allows review and adjustments where necessary.
c. Duration of Acquisition Lead Times
Duration of the acquisition lead times falls back into the realm
of forecasting, which effectively drives the pricing process. This time
period spans the entire acquisition process from initial requirement
specification to the final delivery of the item. The necessity of being
able to accurately predict these times is fundamental to the forecasting,
and therefore the pricing and budgeting process. Some attention is being
placed on improving models which predict financial lead time (FLT) and
production lead time (PLT), elements of the acquisition lead time.
"Q-Star" is a program currently being tested at 5PCC which will aid in
predicting PLT and further aid contracting agents to better select
between price/volume options offered by contractors. Several
improvements to existing forecasting models are possible which will
make the FLT estimates more accurate.
5. Summ ary
The pricing and budgeting processes are heavily dependent on each
other. Pricing follows OSD directives and initially strives to achieve the
legally required 1 1-day operating cash balance. Surcharges allow the NSF
to recover its costs and therefore exist as a revolving fund. This has
resulted in improved readiness. Availability rates for Non-AVDLRs have
improved by over 30% since their inclusion in the NSF [Ref. 23: p. 1-5].
For the Reapportionment budget just prior to the execution year,
the pricing is aimed at balancing NSF cash to the customer budget vice
the 1 1-day requirement. This shift in focus from the 1 1-day objective to
the customer budget is fundamental to the problem of NSF cash
management. While logically justified, in order to maintain TOA and
programs, this shift relegates cash management to a secondary priority.
In summary, the goal of minimizing cash held outside the Treasury is
hindered by the present budgeting and pricing systems.
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V. POTENTIAL CASH MANAGEMENT IMPROVFMFNT5
Chapter IV presented the various methods of controlling and managing
cash within the Navy Stock Fund. It addressed the control mechanisms
available and discussed the major areas of cash control. Four of the
primary financial operations common within any agency handling cash are
billings, collections, disbursements, and deposits. These areas are
operating efficiently within the NSF and require only minor improvements
by NSF managers to increase effectiveness.
A prime consideration for the above statement is that a very small
portion of NSF operations deals with the traditional "cash" sales found in
private retail companies. The vast majority of the NSF transactions are
merely book keeping entries, made within the Treasury Department via a
transfer of obligational authority between accounts. For instance, only
5% of FY85 sales at NSC Puget Sound, Wa., are actual "cash" sales. These
cash sales are made to other Federal agencies, (i.e., the Coast Guard) and
civilian customers such as Pan Am and Westinghouse, who hold
government contracts for service and support of the submarine base -at
Bangor, Wa., and the Nuclear Training Facility at Idaho Falls, id.,
respectively [Ref. 25].
Billings and disbursements were found to adhere to the legislative
guidelines of the Prompt Payment Act and the Deficit Reduction Act.
Interest penalties for late payments, though still large relative to other
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services, have dropped significantly since FY83 and mechanisms are in
place to continue this improving trend.
Collections are also on track with only a few exceptions. Again, at
NSC Puget Sound, collections due from the Coast Guard (approximately
$300,000) are running on the order of 8 months late. This is
understandable, due to the current tight financial position of the Coast
Guard, and is not reflective of the NSF managers' ability to collect. Inter
fund and intra fund transfer systems are in place to handle the internal
collections automatically, theoretically providing "instant" cash.
Problems with this "instant" cash, such as unprocessed billings which
have been as high as $ 1 -2 million at NSC Puget Sound alone and up to $ 1
billion for total NSF, are related primarily to current ADP limitations and
human error. [Ref. 251
Deposits pose little problem since cash collections are turned over on
the day of receipt to the Disbursing Officer, who deposits the funds to a
Treasury bank within 2-3 working days. These primary financial
transactions were not identified as areas for major NSF cash management
improvement during the course of this research.
Six additional areas which have potential for improved cash
management within the NSF are:
A. Flexible Standard Pricing
B. Forecasting
C. Accounting




Each of these areas will be discussed with attention to potential cash
management improvements.
A. FLEXIBLE STANDARD PRICING
The use of flexible standard pricing would allow the Stock Fund
managers to adjust their item prices during the execution year in order to
control NSF cash. There are, however, serious implications which must be
considered before implementing flexible standard prices.
Mid-year price changes were mentioned in Chapter IV as a potential
cash control mechanism. If instituted, this practice would effectively
give the NSF manager more positive control of cash position and flow, if
such a control had been available during FY84, the $550 million
end-of-period cash excess could possibly have been reduced. This control
could work both ways, however, and care would have to be taken to avoid
overcorrecting prices and driving the NSF into a negative cash position. It
is better to err on the side of excess cash.
In 1975, the current pricing computation system was initiated with
the introduction of the Price Stabilization Surcharge (concurrent with
Rate Stabilization for the Navy Industrial Fund). This response to the high
inflation rates encountered during 1975-1980 was an attempt to allow
customer appropriations to be executed in an environment of relative
financial stability. Prices were set just prior to the execution year and
held constant throughout the year. In 1981, the pricing process was
started sooner so that one additional year was available to allow
customer account alignment with the NSF prices in the Navy's submission
to the President's budget.
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As discussed in Chapter IV, current pricing practice sets prices more
than 2 years prior to the execution year and balances, at that time, to the
projected 1 1-day operating cash objective. Customer budget submissions
are then calculated based on these prices. The following year, prices are
set to ensure that the approved customer appropriations can buy all the
Stock Fund material which had been initially programmed. The end result
is that prices are set to balance to the customer budget. NSF cash is
being forced to absorb the variation between the budgeted/forecasted
levels and the actual activity outcome.
While the present system is by no means perfect, it does provide
stability for the customer. Two problem areas exist which impact on
current practice: 1 ) currency of the base cost; and 2) validity of the
Price Stabilization Surcharge. These problems were discussed earlier and
are worthy of continued study. The more fundamental question of whether
or not to use flexible standard prices remains unanswered.
While flexible standard prices would make control of current period
cash easier, it would have a negative impact on the stability of the
present budgeting system. Mid-year price changes could result in a loss
of budgeted "program" if the customer could not afford to pay for his
approved requirements due to higher prices. Additionally, the Navy could
lose budget credibility in Congress for not being able to execute their
budgeted programs.
A decision must be made on the relative priorities of cash management
and stability within the budget process. With the current system,
stability allows for a smooth budgeting process. The price for this
stability is limited control on NSF cash. All factors considered, the
stability of the present system outweighs the benefits of flexible
standard pricing.
Given that flexible standard pricing is not a strong option, the
greatest potential for cash management control shifts to forecasting, the
subject of the next section.
B. FORECASTING
Pricing has been identified as the primary cash management tool for
the NSF. For the reasons mentioned above, the real control is a function
of the accuracy of the forecasted estimates used to derive the prices.
This concept is not new as evidenced by a quote from the Cash
Management Workshop held in Washington D.C. on October 18, 1978:
Agencies can play an important role in the achievement of
efficient government wide cash managment procedures by
providing accurate cash flow forecasts to Treasury.
[Ref
. 6: p. 1 1 ]
Improvements in the accuracy of the existing NSF cash forecasting
models and the consolidation of the various models into one would provide
several key advantages. First, an improved model would aid NSF managers
in achieving the established end-of-period target of 1 1-days operating
cash. Excesses over this target, such as those which occurred in FY84 and
FY85, could possibly be reduced or eliminated. Secondly, with better
accuracy, NSF managers may be able to reduce the operating cash
objective to a level below the current 1 1-day requirement (being careful
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not to allow the cash balance to go negative), thereby reducing the amount
of NSF cash required to be held outside the Treasury.
Improvements to the forecasting model should include several of the
factors discussed in Chapter IV. An in-depth, accurate, accessible
history file of all pertinent accounts should be maintained. This would
allow application of modern statistical techniques such as regression and
time series which may provide better forecasts. Obligation patterns
should reflect seasonal trends such as the increased obligation rate
during the 4th quarter. The model should have the capability of running
sensitivity tests to proposed changes in program requirements or NSF
structures. Critical factors such as financial lead time (FLT) should be
historically derived and calculated using accurate statistical
distributions. Routines should be included to act as "flags" for error
detection due to human error inputs or excessive variance from previous
entries. If a particular entry has changed significantly, the N5F manager
could validate the entry and proceed with the forecast. Finally, the
output should include some form of confidence interval to allow the N5 P
manager to judge the validity of the estimate.
The model should be made available to all levels of the NSF
organization. This would afford each activity the opportunity to monitor
and participate in the cash forecasts. The authors believe that the
incentive for better NSF cash management would be increased and
improved forecast accuracy realized by utilization of the "bottom up"
method with input from the lower levels.
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The 1976 Control Analysis Corporation study presented a model, as
described in Chapter IV, which includes many of these desired
characteristics. An upgrade of this model should be developed to take
advantage of current technology and the availability of microcomputers.
The authors feel that the potential improvements outlined in this study
should be investigated and if possible incorporated into a new cash
forecasting model for the N5F. Further study may allow this model to be
used Navy-wide to help managers forecast and control their cash flows.
There are several specific forecasting related initiatives which can be
pursued which will aid in improving the current forecasting procedures.
These include: 1) obligation validation; 2) contracting PLTs; and 3)
tracking specific obligations to their expenditures to determine actual
FLTs. Though each of these areas are related in the forecasting Drocess,
each will be discussed separately.
1. Obligation Va l ida t ion
Each N5F forecasting model currently in use computes expenditures
by applying FLT to the actual and/or predicted unliquidated obligations.
An accurate obliaation value is critical. Obliaation validation (Obs Val) is
a process by which overdue obligations are reviewed to ensure the
obligations still represent valid requirements, "invalid obligations occur
when material has been requisitioned by the Stock Point which has not
and will not be received, billed or paid for." [Ref. 1 4: p. 33] Obs Val is
done monthly at the ICPs and three times per year at the NSCs. Tables 9
and 10 illustrate SPCC's ongoing effort to identify and revise the value of
unliquidated obligations. As depicted, a significant amount of N5F
obligational authority is tied up in invalid obligations. At NSC Puget
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Sound, between August and December of 1 985, 45% of the total overdue
obligations were determined to be invalid representing Z0% of the dollar
value of these overdue obligations [Ref. 25]. At 5PCC, a six person team
works full time on the Obs Val problem. Their efforts have identified
invalid obligation dollar values at the rate of 1 0% of the overdue
obligations. In FY84, the funds released for additional requirements at
SPCC alone were more than $63 million. On average, this amount eauates
to 3% of the total unliquidated obligations. [Ref. 42]
2. Contracting for PIT
Production lead time (PLT) is the time from initial contract award
to the delivery of the first item. This is the primary component of
financial lead time (FLT). By including PLT in the contract, the
contracting agent can effectively define the major portion of FLT. The
remaining lead time, from receipt of the material to payment of the bill,
is primarily controlled by the Navy and the billing system. This practice
would enable the FLT, the most significant variable in deriving
expenditures from obligations, to be reduced to a more predictable value.
Care must be taken not to move too fast in the effort to contract for
PLTs. if PLTs are reduced too quickly, the resulting early expenditures
could conceivably drive the N5F into a negative cash position.
Contracting for procurement of N5F material occurs at the !CP and
the NSC levels. The ICPs provide guidance to the NSCs which details
items which are authorized for local procurement. By contracting for
PLT, cash managment control can be extended down to the NSC, increasing
cash awareness and improving overall cash management.
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3. Tracking Obligations to Expenditures
The prediction of FLT continues to be a difficult task which has
become essentially a matter of individual judgement on the part of the
NSF manager. FLT is the time between the obligation and the expenditure.
In order to eliminate much of the guesswork from the FLT estimates, a
system of tracking a specific obligation through to its expenditure should
be designed and installed. By collecting actual FLTs for each obligation, a
real-world historical distribution data base could be gathered. This data
base could then be analyzed to identify certain items as outliers and
adjustments to predictions could be made accordingly. This would allow
for better estimates of a mean FLT for use in forecasting and would
provide a standard deviation for use in establishing the confidence
interval.
This sounds simple on the surface but there are several problems
which must first be addressed.
The mechanics of this tracking system will require careful
planning and implementation. A preferred method would be to assign a
number to the obligation, including the Julian date, which would follow
through to the expenditure. The expenditure date could then be compared
to the date in the obligation number and the FLT could be automatically
derived. No such number currently follows through the entire process
from obligation to expenditure for all Navy procurements. This problem is
compounded by the use of two totally separate numbers for the accounting
and the supply systems. The line of accounting data uses job order
number and the supply system uses a requisition number.
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There are numerous candidates for such a number including the
purchase order number and the contract number. Unfortunately, neither of
these contains the Julian date which makes them unsuitable for the
proposed system. A more likely candidate would be the requisition
number, a 14 character string which does include the Julian date and is
initiated by the activity requesting the procurement. A sample
requisition number is coded as follows:
UiC EY _Qa±£ Serial No .
N00244- 6-323 - 1234
One concern with the proposed system was the difficulty and
potential confusion in selecting the actual date of obligation. Aside from
the inclusion of the Julian date, this number would be a good tracking
number due to its coincidence with the initiation of the obligation. The
requisition number is established as the first document for the
procurement action. The concern exDressed by some managers ove r
requisition numbers which are cut prior to the availability of funds, a
delay in some cases of up to six months, is actually a benefit for the
system. While the date in this number will not coincide with the
accounting system entry of an obligation, it does more realistically
reflect the actual date that the funds were encumbered for the obligation.
The time delay between initial requisitioning and actual signing of a
contract is procurement lead time and should be reflected in the total
FLT.
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The requisition number is included on the purchase order, and is
also included on the contract report. Since it includes the date and
corresponds to the encumbrance of funds, the requisition number is
recommended for use in the proposed tracking system.
Certain policies and systems would need to be developed to allow
the tracking of specific obligations to expenditures. Due to the critical
nature of FLTs in the forecasting process, computation of statistically
distributed FLTs derived from actual data should be worth the effort.
Currently the development of resystemization, a software upgrade at the
ICP level, is ongoing in the Navy. The timing appears excellent for
inclusion of the above tracking system in the resystemization program.
The addition of this tracking system would provide useful information for
N5F managers as well as others within the Navy financial management
community.
C. ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
Cash management requires concise, accurate, and timely information
for the NSF managers' use. The Navy currently uses many accounting
systems, each separate and different. These range from obligations!
accounting to accrual and cost accounting. It is no surprise that there is
some difficulty in translating information from one system to another
and problem areas exist within the Navy as a result of this variety of
systems. Insufficient data generated by NSF's accounting systems
complicates managers' tasks in controlling and monitoring cash. When a
problem has been identified, the accounting system "doesn't offer much of
a means to figure out what did happen." [Ref. 17] Continuing problems
26
exist such as discrepancies between the inventory account and the
financial account at the stock point. This reconciliation is accomplished
by matching the Master Stock Inventory Record (MSIR) with the Financial
Inventory Control Ledger (FICL). Two G5-9 employees at NSC San Diego
monitor this reconciliation full time and still some inaccuracies arise.
Further, certain procedures exist which contribute to the difficulty of
managing NSF cash. Two of the most notable are: 1 ) the use of Register
24 collection estimates; and 2) Centrally Managed Allotments for the
SAC 207 Ships.
• 1. Register 24 Collection Estimates
Register 24 is an estimating technique which has resulted in
sizeable misstatements of end-of-period NSF cash. Originally
established as a tool to counter late or missing reports of collections to
the Fleet Accounting and Disbursement Centers (FAADCs), these entries
attempt to smooth out the overall collections reported by the FAADC,
compensating for understatements due to delinquent reports. When an
issuing activity (stock point or iCP) fails to complete the NAVCOMPT
form 2074 on time, a register 24 entry is made at NAFC in order to
estimate the collections and to effect interfund transfers. This estimate
is "backed out" when the actual report form comes in, normally the next
month, and the actual numbers are entered. Problems exist in three areas:
1 ) the estimate values; 2) the tape handling mechanics; and 3) the lack
of an ingrained validity check.
Within the area of estimates, two problems surface. First the
estimates are not seasonally phased values but are averages of the last 12
months of collections for each particular activity. Based on preliminary
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investigations, out of some 40 activities making estimates in FY85,
estimated collections were running between 30% and 36% above actual
collections. [Ref. 17] Second, the estimates are pre-programmed and
entered into the system once at the beginning of the year. They are not
adjustable as more current information, such as changes in support
patterns (e.g., peace keeping actions in the Middle East), becomes
available. In short, the validity of these estimates is in question and no
changes are allowed during the execution year. The need for flexibility
requires that the system should be responsive to these changes and allow
for the mid-year adjustment of collection estimates.
The second problem area deals with the mechanics of the system
and the lack of controls to prevent human errors. The estimates are
loaded into the system via magnetic tapes. When the actual value laces
arrive, they are loaded into the system. The old tape must then be loaded
once more in order to "back out" the previous estimate. Multiple handling
of tapes and human inputs and changes have resulted in errors when the
actuals were entered and the estimates were inadvertently not removed.
This is speculated to have occurred in September and October of ! 985,
resulting in an overstated collections account of approximately $50
million. The system should have programmed checks to catch duplicate
entry of actuals and estimates tapes.
An example of a different problem, which may have occurred in the
past, highlights the lack of control data available in the present
accounting systems. One aircraft carrier submitted an October estimate
on the order of $25 million, much larger than any single month estimate
should be for one ship. At the same, time no other major estimates were
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made for October so that the total estimate for all activities did not
appear out of line with the normal levels. In reality, the total collections
were much lower than estimated due to the error by the one carrier. The
system did not identify the gross overestimation as an error to N5F
managers which denied them the chance to stop the entry. An
overstatement such as this will invalidate the cash requirement
calculations by a like amount. [Ref. 17]
Instances of ships being as much as 9 months late in reporting •
actual figures have further compounded this problem. Reasons for the
late reports include deployment cycles, ADP parity errors, and simple
mis-routing of the hard copy paper. The obvious solution to the above
problem is to eliminate late reports and thus the need for estimates. In
lieu of that, forecasts of estimates must be improved and the Register 24
system should allow mid-year updates to the estimates.
2. Centrally Managed Allotment (CMA) / Budget Estimation f or Sggclaj
Accounting Class (SAC) 207 Ships
The use of CMA accounting has been identified as a potential
problem by GAO. It has been called "too loose" primarily due to the lack o f
control over obligations by the central accounting agency, it amounts to a
catch-up form of accounting, recording what has happened without
inducing the need to control "spending" as it occurs. This trailing posture
is illustrated by the routine underestimation of BP28 obligations for SAC
207 ships predicted each year. Advantages and disadvantages exist for
using CMA which will be discussed below.
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The Navy Comptroller's Manual defines a Centrally Managed Allotment
(CMA) as:
... an allotment made by the head of an office or command in a
specific amount oublished for charge for specific purposes by
designated officials without specific limitation as to any
individual official. A centrally managed allotment is issued when
a regular allotment is impractical. [Ref. 16: p. a-3]
ICP Budget Project managers use the CMA as one method of
executing the .resources subal located to them by NAV5UP, as was
described in Chapter III. 5PCC and ASO use this method to a lesser degree
than NAVRE550 and FMSO, who are heavily involved in this type of
execution.
Those customers authorized to charge against a Budget Project CMA
effectively have authority to spend or obligate funds with no specific
dollar target. These units include small shore activities not holding
specific allotments and afloat units carrying N5F financed inventories
known as Special Accounting Class (SAC) 207 Ships. The Budget Project
Manager acts as the AAA for these allotments and establishes NSF
simultaneous obligations and expenditures when notified that
disbursements of NSF resources have been charged against them. The
manager knows nothing about the obligation until he gets the bill.
The primary advantages of this system are: 1 ) enhanced fleet
readiness, since the SAC 207 ships have essentially a blank check for
purchases; and 2) a minimized accounting workload which decreases the
manpower needed to perform the required accounting functions. Critics
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have described the process as being one which doesn't provide positive
control. The main criticism has been aimed at the SAC 207 shio
accounting process. This area is receiving a great deal of attention at all
levels of the N5F organization. [Ref. 30]
To review, the Navy maintains NSF inventories aboard afloat stock
outlets comprised of Mobile Logistic SupDort Force ships, airc n c* f *
carriers, and tenders. These ships carry specific material designated in
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists (C05Ai_5) to succor: themselves
as well as material designated to support their spec's: m'ss'cr. An
example would be the items found in an Aviation Consolidated Allowance
List (AVCAL) which are carried aboard an aircraft carrier. These various
load and allowance list inventories are financed by the NSF and are
carried in FiR Special Accounting Class (SAC) 207.
Resupply of SAC 207 units is usually provided by asnore Navy stc
:
points Retail material which is net available in the \3 r at "^e
supporting stock point is procured from OLA arc other stock r"urcs as 2
cnarce to a - M50 CMA for BP28 (Retail Supplies).
How much material is going to be charged to the 5 D28 account by
SAC 207 units? This question is reiterated here to emphasize that * ni s is




amount nas oeen known to fluctuate between $1 million and $50 million
per cay. [Ref. 20]
The next question asked is "How does the BP manager budget with
the uncertainty involved in BP 28?" Since 1982, the projected budget
estimate for BP28 has been consistently understated by $20-$30 million,
resulting in significant overexertion. The reasons for low estimates are
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under study by FMSO but are obviously related to the difficulty involved in
predicting actual SAC 207 ships requirements and obligations. [Ref. 20]
Due to the historical performance in BP 28 budget estimation, FMSO
has adopted a practice of adding a contingency dollar amount of $30
million (to be used only for SAC 207 ships) to their projected budget
estimate prior to submission to NAVSUP. [Ref. 20] Due to this excess of
contingency funds being "tied up" in BP28, this practice is viewed by the
authors as an area for potential NSF cash management improvement.
One possible, but not recommended, solution to this problem would
be to establish a specific allotment for each SAC 207 unit. This would
make the obligations predictable and eliminate the uncertainty. This
would, however, require increased accounting manpower and, more
importantly, could severely impact on fleet flexibility and readiness. T he
authors do not advocate a specific allotment spending constraint on
operational SAC 207 units.
A second possible and more favorable solution to the problem would
be to develop an improved method of forecasting SAC 207 unit BP28
requirements. While this would certainly be no easy task, the end result
of the successful development of such a tool would be to eliminate the
necessity for a $30 million contingency amount to be added to the BP28
budget estimate. This would provide a more valid picture of NSF
requirements, return the contingency amount to the Treasury, and
eliminate extra cash held outside the Treasury in NSF cash.
32
D. NSF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
Automatic data processing (ADP) within the NSF has made great
strides in recent years and is most certainly a key to future management
improvements. Overall system upgrades have been initiated and are
ongoing. It is imperative that these upgrades consider requirements from
all levels of NSF management and then coordinate and integrate these
requirements into a cohesive, functional, and productive system. These
changes are being made and should be expedited as much as possible
without sacrificing accuracy or validity. Two areas will be discussed:
1 ) the current upgrades in place or in process; and 2) the need to
coordinate and share individual activity ADP developments.
I. ADP System Upgrade
Successful NSF cash management requires that the various stock
points provide accurate and timely financial and inventory reports to the
iCPs and in turn to NAVSUP, the actual manacer of NSF cash. Correct
financial and inventory records enable NAVSUP to better control
execution of the current FY budget and allow the NSF manager to work
with a more valid historical data base when estimating future
obligations, expenditures and demand requirements. The end result is a
more accurate forecast of NSF ending cash balances for outyear budgets.
The importance of valid NSF cash forecasting was previously detailed in
Chapter IV.
ADP systems are heavily integrated into the management of the NSF
operation. These systems compile and provide the various reports which
are forwarded to the appropriate levels to record financial and inventory
status. Any problem with the ADP system at any level has the potential
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to cause report submission delays, inaccuracies, and a general
degradation to the overall management of the NSF. Antiquated computer
hardware, increasing supply system logistics requirements, and a
profusion of new financial system demands have all contributed to the
necessity for development of upgraded hardware and software systems to
ensure rapid and accurate response in the future.
This requirement has been recognized by NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT
and programs such as Resolicitation, Stock Point ADP Replacement
(SPAR), and the Integrated Disbursing and Accounting Financial
Management System (IDAFM5) are currently underway to accomplish this
goal. Rapid development, integration, and implementation of these
programs are viewed by the authors as critical areas for NSF casn
management improvement.
a. Resolicitation
Resolicitation is a NAV5UP sponsored project to enable iCPs to
replace the older computer equipment which has supported the Uni form
inventory Control Program (UICP), with faster, more efficient
state-of-the-art hardware and software systems. It Is scheduled for
completion in FY89. Resolicitation consists of four phases: 1 ) definition
of requirements; 2) acquisition; 3) conversion/transition; and 4)
resystemization. The planning stages for phase 4 have been completed
and system development has commenced. A description of
Resystemization is provided in the A50 Budget Execution Plan for FY85:
Resystemization involves the functional redevelopment of the
UICP system to expand and improve logistics management
capabilities and to exploit the advanced technology inherent in
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the new hardware and software being acquired under the ICP
Resolicitation Project. The result will be a comprehensive,
integrated, automated information processing system to support
the logistics mission of the Navy iCPs. [Ref. 43: p. !!-!0]
b. SPAR
A program similar to Resolicitation, called SPAR, provides for
system upgrades at the stock point level. Completion of the SPAR
program is scheduled for 1991. Benefits similar to those gained by the
ICPs through Resystemization, such as improved inventory control, will
be provided at the stock points when SPAR is implemented.
c. IDAFMS
The Integrated Disbursing and Accounting Financial Manaceme or.
System (IDAFMS) is sponsored by NAVCOMPT and is scheduled for
completion in 1989. This is a program designed to develop a standard
financial system which integrates the official accounting and Gisb |jrs ,r":
data bases. Improvements in the areas of unreconciled cash, duplicate
payments, undistributed disbursements, and a general facilitation of
accounting and disbursing procedures are anticipated upon full
implementation of the IDAFMS.
The authors fully support the rapid implementation and
complete integration of upgraded ADP programs at all levels of the NSF
organization. While these upgrades are expensive both in terms of time
and money, the improvements in inventory and financial record accuracy
offered by programs such as Resolicitation, SPAR, and IDAFMS should
significantly contribute to improved NSF cash management and should be
pursued with diligence.
135
2. Centralized Control of Locally Generated Programs
The increased emphasis placed upon ADP upgrade by NAVSUP and
NAVCOMPT has in turn generated increased mini/micro computer usage by
N5F personnel at all levels. Recent technological advances incorporating
"user friendly" programming techniques have enabled the development of
programs at the user level which facilitate and enhance Stock Fund
management.
During interviews conducted with N5F managers at NAVCOMPT,
NAVSUP, ICPs, and stock points, the authors learned of several locally
generated computer programs which provide "invaluable assistance" to
the manager in running his or her particular operation. Although many of
these local programs have application only to the developer, the authors
believe that there may be certain programs with potential application to
all, or at least several, of the NSF activities. A particular program
developed and currently in use at one stock point may be the answer to
another stock point's problem, if only those personnel are made aware of
its existence. However, when individuals were questioned as to whether
or not the program had been shared with other activities, a negative
response was usually received. No NSF central control system or
procedure seems to exist at this time which would provide information
regarding these program developments to other similar activities. This
area may have potential for NSF cash management improvement. Certain
locally developed programs may improve cash management at the user
level. The existence of such a program should be publicized within the
NSF organization so that all other field activities may take advantage of
the potential improvements.
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One such program, developed two years ago at NSC San Diego for
use on a Wang computer, is called the Report of Discrepancy Management
Information System (R0DMI5). NSC San Diego was experiencing a problem
in the area of material receipt at that time with over $6 million being
carried in the MateriaHn-Transit over 180 Days (MIT 180) account. This
excessive amount was due in large part to the Report of Discrepancy
(ROD) system which was then in place [Ref. 49].
Established procedures call for a ROD to be submitted by the
receiving agency when receipt of material from another agency is an
overage or a shortage, or when a shipment is damaged or is identified 2s a
non-receipt. The receiving agency has already been billed by the providing
agency so the contracted amount of material has been paid for out of the
receiving agency's funds. A ROD is a method for the receiving agency to
obtain credit from the providing agency for that portion of the mater iai
not received in Droper condition or for material not received at all. T 'ne
ROD system in existence at NSC San Diego two years ago was not
effective in identifying these receipt discrepancies and the M!T 180
account had grown accordingly.
Development of the presently used RODMIS program and aggressive
management by responsible NSC personnel have resulted in a $5 mi -lion
reduction in the MIT 180 account. Credit was received for much of the
material in that account from providing activities and these refunds were
utilized for additional N5F purchases. The portion which was not credited
was at least cleared from NSC San Diego's MIT 180 account.
The RODMIS program is one example of a locally generated program
which improves cash management for the developing activity. This
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program has not officially been shared with other NSCs. The authors
speculate that other beneficial programs exist at all levels of the NSF
organization which should be publicized. A centralized system or set of
procedures which would enable distribution of these programs to other
potential users would enhance and improve NSF cash management.
E. INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
The Treasury Department cash management goal is to minimize the
amount of cash held outside the Treasury Cash Account in order to reduce
the amount of borrowing and the resulting interest payments on the
Federal debt. Incentive systems are essential in ensuring successful
achievement of any goal. In a report on cash management in the Federal
government, the lack of incentive systems was cited as one of the prime
contributors to ineffective cash management [Ref. 5]. The lack of goal
congruent cash management incentive systems for NSF managers
currently inhibits optimum cash management within the NSF.
NSF incentive system problem areas include: 1 ) the lack of a positive
performance reporting criteria for local activities; 2) lack of incentive
to take discounts; 3) use of uncontrollable or innappropriate
measurement targets; and 4) existence of cash management at
headouarters level only.
l. Positive Reporting Criteria
Aside from an occasional comment in a NSF managers' evaluation,
there is no quantitative, positive system in place to recognize good cash
management. One system which is used currently reports on the number
of discounts lost and the amount of interest paid for late payments, both
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negative indicators. A better system would identify the dollar amount of
discounts achieved and the total savings to the government generated by
the NSF manager. By rewarding a manager commensurate with the amount
of savings achieved instead of punishing him for the number of discounts
missed (which could represent a very small savings) both the NSF and the
Federal government would benefit. This type of positive report criteria is
essential in promoting effective and goal congruent cash management
within the NSF.
2. Discount Incentives
The second area deals with the lack of incentive to take discounts.
Under the current budgeting and fund allotment system, if a stock point
aggressively pursues discounts, the next year's budget may be cut by a
like amount, if $20,000 is "saved" through discounts, the following year's
obligational authority may be cut by $20,000 because less was "spent'.
Whether or not this would actually occur, and there are sufficient cases
to indicate that it is very possible, the fact that managers believe the
oossibility exists serves to make them less inclined to save "too much".
NSF managers must not be "penalized" by budget cuts for saving
government funds. If the budget review process indicates that savings
are real and repetitive then a budget cut is certainly aDpropriate, but the
perception of penalizing for saving must be disoelled.
3. Performance Measurement Targets
The use of inappropriate measures of management performance is
another area of concern. At the iCP level, the concentration on
obligations vice expenditures contributes to cash management problems.
ICP cash managers currently manage to the "deviation", the difference
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between customer orders and obligations. They are not responsible for, or
evaluated on, the expenditure of the funds obligated and are therefore not
concerned about them. They do not manage cash.
At the headquarters level, NAVCOMPT and NAV5UP manage to the
outlay target, the difference between collections and expenditures. T he
problem, as stated in Chapter IV, is that N5F managers have no control
over the actual expenditures and therefore have no control over the
outlays. Measuring NSF managers' performance against a target over
which they have no control does not motivate them to aggresssively
pursue cash management. Performance measurement criteria at both the
headquarters and the ICP levels is inappropriate and the incentive to
effectively manage cash is lacking. Identification of aoDropriate criteria
could yield an improvement in N5F cash management.
4. Decent ra l ized Cash Management
The final area to be discussed is the decentralization of cash
control and management. The current system concentrates N5F casn
control at the headquarters level. If N5F cash management is a priority,
consideration should be given to decentralizing the operation in oraer to
motivate all levels of the N5F organization to "manage" cash. During
interviews at the ICPs and NSCs the authors were reDeatedly advised that
the managers at these levels "don't really manage cash". If each iCP and
stock point had, in addition to their obligational authority account, a
separate cash account, the N5F managers at all levels would at least
"monitor" cash and be concerned and interested in improving cash
management.
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Such a system would effectively be an internal control mechanism
and is not without precedent or support. The Air Force currently
segments their cash control into several divisions. 6A0 has stated that
they prefer a decentralized system. DOD is only responsible to OMB for
management of stock fund cash at the aggregate, service stock fund level.
They do not direct the cash operations of individual service Stock Funds
below the appropriations level. If the NSF cash account was
decentralized and a particular sub-account (i.e., SPCC or NSC San Diego)
were to go negative, DOD would not be concerned as long as the total Navy
Stock Fund remained solvent. From the DOD level, each service stocx fund
has only one cash account. Actual situations have occurred in the past
when Air Force cash control divisions went negative with no adverse DOD
reaction.
The primary advantage of decentralizing cash centers on the idea
that Stock Fund managers at all levels would be responsible for cash arc
therefore be motivated towards better management of "their" casn.
Lower level forecasting of expenditures could possibly yield improved
expenditure estimates summing to a more accurate NSF total estimate.
A cash account would not be susceptible to the fourth quarter spenaing
push because the excess funds would roll over to the next fiscal year.
This would promote "smarter", more efficient end-of-year buying
throughout the Navy.
All of the above areas deal with providing an incentive to NSF cash
managers to better manage cash. The authors recommend establishment
of positive reporting systems and incentives to take discounts,
Ml
adjustment of the measurement criteria to center on controllable targets,
and consideration for decentralization of cash accounts.
F. HUMAN FACTORS
The authors have included this last area of possible cash management
improvement to identify some of the "softer", though no less important,
management areas. In order for any system to operate more effectively
there must be highly dedicated and motivated employees working together
towards that goal. That quality and sense of teamwork are essential for
productive improvement. Areas identified for potential improvement can
be divided into three groups: 1 ) personnel quality and training; 2)
personnel turnover; and 3) resistance to change.
!. Personnel Quality and Training
"Human error" was identified as a significant problem at every N5F
activity visited by the authors. As stated before, the primary functions
of N5F cash management are working well and the only potential
improvements in most areas amount to "fine tuning". The minimization of
human error is essential to this effort. Correction of mistakes, such as
entering a charge of $37,000 for a $0.37 bolt or incorrectly filling out a
collection report from a SAC 207 ship, requires excessive time and
effort. Minimization of these errors requires well trained, quality people.
A concentrated effort should be made to ensure that only capable,
qualified personnel are performing the cash related functions and to make
individuals accountable for their performance. Rewards should be given
for error-free work and these rewards should be highly publicized to
encourage others to strive to the same quality level of performance. A
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system for advancing suggestions fop improvement should be established
and fully supported throughout the N5F. An aggressive training program
should be pursued to ensure that the requisite talent and corporate
knowledge base is maintained. Programs are in effect at every level and
should be supported and monitored for correctness and completeness.
2. Personnel Turnover
Another problem area which was frequently noted, particularly at
the ICP level, was personnel turnover. Entry level personnel are hired,
gain experience, and advance to the G5-4 or G5-5 level. Due to the lack o f
middle grade billets, the majority are then forced to transfer to other
jobs in order to advance further in grade. This results in a serious loss of
talent and experience and causes the majority of employees to oe
relatively new on the job, requiring a great amount of additional r "? ,rv, ng.
Some adjustment of current job descriotions and G5 ratings should oe
considered to avoid this turnover of personnel.
3. Resis tanc e to Change
The last item concerns a small minority of employees wno for
various reasons are unable or unwilling to acceot changes which will
facilitate cash management improvements. Some are resistant to
changes such as computer integration 3nd upgrades. Phrases like "we've
done it this way for 100 years and it's worked ok so far" reflect an
attitude which may stand in the way of constructive change. Similarly,
"If it aint broke, don't fix it" reveals a possible aversion to at least
looking for potential improvements. Others actually fear computers and
are unable to take advantage of a new system's potential. This fear may
be the result of concern over the potential loss of a job due to automation
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or may be related to a mistrust of technological advances. Certainly, any
change must be carefully thought out and tested where possible, but the
ability to accept and support change is essential in a growing, evolving
organization.
6. SUMMARY
Potential cash management improvements do exist for the Navy Stock
Fund. While flexible standard Dricina would serve to imorove cash
management control, the adverse effects on the stability of the current
budgeting and pricing systems outweigh the benefits to be gained. Other
areas which hold strong promise include the improvement of cash
forecasting models and procedures. Funds released for additional
requirements through obligation validation and better projections of
Register 24 and SAC 207 estimates will lower the Navy Stock Fund's cash
requirements and therefore the requirements of the Federal government.
ADP improvements have been identified and are coming on-line. T hese
programs and systems must be expedited in order to realize the savings
potential as soon as possible. Incentive systems and human factors of
pensonnel management and leadership must also be addnessed if the NSF7
is to make improvements in its curnent cash management practices.
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VI. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Effective cash management in the public sector minimizes the amount
of cash required to be held outside the United States Treasury Cash
Account. This reduces the required amount of Government borrowing arc
thus decreases the interest payment on the Federal debt.
Tfte purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the cash management
posture of one fiscal operation within the Department of the Navy (DON),
the Navy Stock Fund, which manages in excess of $18 billion. The
research aim was to identify areas of potential NSF casn management
improvement which could, in turn, improve the Government cash position.
Chapter two provided a background on cash management in tre public
sector, discussing development of the casn management orogram at t r:e
"ederal government level since 1970. The impact of the current cash
management regulatory framework upon the Department of Defense
agencies and, more specifically, the Department of the Navy, was
addressed. While early payments have been effectively eliminated within
DON since FY33, interest penalty oayments remain a problem
Chapter three discussed the history of the Navy Stock Fund since i 373
and provided additional background information regarding the actual NSF
operation. The revolving fund concept was described as was the
apportionment process which provides the NSF its obiigational authority.
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The various categories of material within the Navy supply system were
defined. It was pointed out that the NSF finances only secondary items.
Further subclassifications of secondary items by repair capability were
listed. NSF relationships with the six other stock funds were discussed
and unique DLA operations for Navy customers were illustrated. The NSF
organizational structure was described and it was noted that the NSF
consists of ten separate Budget Projects, supervised by six project
managers. A description of the inventory structure commonly found at an
NSF stock point was provided and wholesale and retail inventories were
defined. Obligational, financial inventory, and revolving fund accounting
procedures, all common to the NSF, were discussed in detail. Finally,
recent developments since 1981 which have impacted NSF operations
were noted. These included: 1) Introduction of DLRs into the NSF, 2) f iSF
financing of Ships Overhaul Material; 3) Appropriated funds for inventory
augmentation.
Chapter four examined current NSF cash management practices. Long
and short range cash controls were identified and evaluated. The lack of
effective short range control was noted. The fundamental areas of
billings, collections, disbursements and deposits were found to be
operating effectively in accordance with all government established cash
management programs. NSF procedures for forecasting, pricing and
budgeting were also studied and the various factors which affect these
areas were presented, including those unique to DLR items. The NSF cash
balance objective was found to be equal to 1 I days of cash operations
(based on an average daily disbursement rate). Cash position forecasting
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models used by NAVSUP and NAVCOMPT to attain this objective were
compared and possible advantages provided by an additional mode'
;
not
currently in use, were listed.
ChaDter five presented six areas which offer potential for improve?
cash management within the NSF: 1 ) flexible standard pricing; 1
forecasting; 3) accounting; 4) automated data processing; 5) incentives
a~d 6) human factors, it was noted that implementation of a flexible
standard pricing system during the budget execution year would facilitate
better control of current period cash. However, the stability of the
oresent N5F budgeting system would be adversely affected, thus mak ir
:
implementation undesirable. Within the remaining five areas, actions
were identified which would better enable NSF managers tc :ontrol the *
:ash.
5 ::' :_.5!Ons
~~e authors" findings, generated from reseat" :ohducted juring the
:_
:
". i - months, are summarized in the following conclusions
~-e M3E systems for bill'ngs. co ; lections. sJiSJMSgmfiDJS, s"c
(HpnoQit^ ^ro work'inn afforf'v^'v in ^rrir^^^ro with ~- FPiipr^l
established programs . Potential for minor improvement exists : .'.
no actions which would result in major cash management
improvementswere identified in these areas.
2. Short term control of NSF cash is ineffective at all "leveis . T ~e long
term controls of forecasting and pricing are the only real control
available to NSF managers. As discussed in Chapter i V, section 5,
the need for short term control is essential if the NSF managers
are to effectively manage cash. Short term controls were
identified in the form of: 1 ) loans or transfers; 2) adjusting
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standard prices and/or surcharges; 3) altering transaction and
processing rates; and 4) restricting obligational authority. Each of
these controls was discussed with all but loans and transfers being
identified as infeasible given the present N5F structure and
operations. Transfers between stock funds have been discontinued
and loans are only a temporary fix for a cash shortage or excess.
Therefore, no effective short term controls exist.
3. Implementation of a flexible standard pricing system would
improve control of current period cash but would adversely impaci
the stability of the current NSF budgeting process . Prices are set
in the initial budget submission for a fiscal year in order to
achieve the required 1 1-day operating cash objective. They are
reset in September, just prior to the execution year, in order to
balance with the customers' budgets, and are held constant
throughout the execution year in order to protect "program" arc r.he
Navy's Total Obligational Authority (TOA). While mid-year price
changes would afford better control over current oeriod cash flow
and position, they could result in a loss of budgeted program if the
customer could not afford to pay for his approved requirements due
to higher prices. Additionally, the Navy could lose budget
credibility in Congress for not be>ng able to execute their budgeted
programs.
M. NSF end-of-period cash forecasts are inaccurate and neeo
improvement . The importance of accuracy in these forecasts is
implicit in their applications. If the cash forecast is not accurate,
the entire pricing and budgeting system will suffer. As noted in
Table 8, cash forecasts for outlays were in error by factors of ! 4
and 5.5 in FY84 and FY85, respectively. These are significant
variances and, given the total amount of funds in the NSF, represent
a large amount of cash. The $588 million cash excess in FY85
represents a good deal of "program" not bought by the Navy and, in
the macro view, a large sum that the Treasury would not have had
to borrow if the forecast had been more accurate.
5. Automated data processing (ADP) system upgrades should enhance
NSF cash management . ADP within the NSF has made great strides
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in recent years and is certainly a key to future management
improvements. Overall system upgrades have been initiated and are
ongoing. Improvements in inventory and financial record accuracy
will lead to better control and budget execution of NSF cash.
Better data will result in better forecasts with the resulting
benefits as mentioned above. Implementation of these ADP system
upgrades should be expedited as much as possible, without
sacrificing accuracy or validity, in order to take advantage of tne:=e
benefits at the earliest date.
6. Incentive systems for NSF cash mangers need improvement at all
levels
. Incentive systems are essential in ensuring achievement of
any goal. The lack of goal congruent incentive systems has been
cited as a problem which inhibits effective cash management
within the Federal government. NSF managers below the
level are not currently tasked with managing cash. They manage to
the deviation between customer orders and obligations and do not
get involved in the actual expenditure of funds, the casn outflow
Additionally, current performance measurement criteria for
NAV5UP and NAVCOMPT NSF managers (outlay target) is not based
upon factors which they can control (expenditures). This lack of
goal congruent incentive systems results in less than optimal cash
management within the NSF.
7. Minimization of human error is a key factor toward imsrov"^ -VSF
cash management . Much time and energy is currently expended ir-
correcting simple transposition or entry errors made when
recording and reporting NSF transactions. If these human errors
could be minimized, not only would the accuracy of NSF accounting
and reporting system be improved, but the manpower currently
required to correct these errors could be put to more efficient use
within the NSF.
None of the conclusions listed above come as any great surprise. Many
of the areas which present problems to the NSF cash management effort
are common to other organizations and have been identified in previous
cash management studies. Given the considerable attention at the Federal
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level towards billings, collections, disbursements, and deposits during
the recent past, significant problems in these basic areas were neither
expected nor found.
Short term cash control is critical for successful cash management.
It is also the most difficult control to achieve within the N5F. Flexible
standard pricing is acknowledged as a potential short term control but it
may be inappropriate due to stability constraints in the DOD and Federal
budgeting system. The existing management tools of pricing and
forecasting, confined to the long range horizon, do not offer NSF managers
sufficient control over cash flow or position in the execution year.
The requirements for improved forecasts and improved ADP systems
are obvious and have received wide-spread attention. Benefits of these
improvements are well documented as is the high price tag associated
with their implementation. Follow-on studies in these areas will most
likely be conducted and shoula further "fine tune" NSF cash management.
The more subjective areas of incentive systems ana human factors
offer definite possibilities for improvement. Unfortunately, these areas
are too often overlooked and do not receive the publicity or attention that
they deserve. The benefits to be gained from improvements in these
areas should be realizea at little additional cost to the government.
Increased awareness and a willingness to make changes are required
initial steps towards improved NSF cash management. The desire,
motivation, and incentive must be created to encourage NSF managers to
make these necessary improvements and achieve the goal of better cash
management within the NSF.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommended actions would contribute to improving
overall N5F cash management operations and additionally would assist in
reducing Federal bonnowing neduirements and the resultant debt interest
payments:
1. A more accurate model for NSF cash position forecasting should be
developed
. This would result in a more accurate NSF end-of-period
cash forecast, which would aid NSF managers in achieving the
established 1 1-day operating cash objective. Cash excesses over
this target as occurred in FY84 and FY85 could possibly be reduced
or eliminated. Further, with improved accuracy, the NSF managers
may be able to reduce the operating cash objective to a level below
the current 1 1-day requirement, thereby reducing the amount of
NSF cash required to be held outside the Treasury.
2. Obligation validation (Obs Val) procedures at ICP/stock point levels
should be intensified . Obligation validation procedures release
funds which have been tied up in invalid obligations. In FY34 these
funds at SPCC alone amounted to $63 million, which equates to
~~
of that ICP's total unliquidated obligations. An additional reward
from intensified Obs Val efforts would be a more accurate
obligation prediction used in the current NSF forecast models to
generate forecasted expenditures. The benefits of improved
forecasts have been cited in the previous paragraph.
3. Production lead time (PLT) should be included in procurement
contracts . Production lead time is the primary component of
financial lead time (FLT), the most significant variable in deriving
expenditures from obligations. By including PLT in the procurement
contract, PLT can be better defined, allowing FLT to be reduced to a
more predictable value, resulting ultimately in a more accurate
expenditure forecast.
4 A system which will enable tracking of a specific obligation
through to expenditure should be developed . FLT is the time
between an obligation and its corresponding expenditure. Such a
system would eliminate much of the guesswork in FLT estimates by
establishing a real-world historical distribution data base. This
data could then be analyzed to identify outliers and adjustments to
predictions could be made accordingly. This would allow for better
estimates of a mean FLT to be used in forecasting and would also
provide a standard deviation for use in calculating confidence
intervals for NSF end-of-period cash projections. Once again,
improved NSF forecasts would be the real benefit of this system.
Better forecasting methods should be developed in two additiona l
areas: 1) Register 24 collection estimates: and 2) BP26
obligation estimates for SAC 207 units . Register 24 estimates are
used to smooth out the effects of late collection reports from
Centrally Managed Account (CMA) user activities. FY85 estimates
were between 30% and 36% above the actual collections, in the
second area, due to the uncertainty of SAC 207 ship obligations
since 1982, initial BP28 obligation estimates have been
consistently understated by $20-30 million. Due to this historical
performance in BP28 budget estimation, FMSO has adopted 2
practice of adding a contingency dollar amount of $30 million to
their budget estimate prior to submission to NAVSUP. improved
methods of forecasting in these two areas will result in more
accurate accounting, requirements estimation, and budgeting of NSF
cash, which will, in turn, yield better cash management.
6. Rapid implementation and integration of ADP upgrades should be
pursued at all NSF levels . Several ADP improvement programs are
ongoing including: 1) Resolicitation; 2) SPAR; ana 3) IDAFMS. Toe
improvements in inventory and financial record accuracy offered by
such programs would enable better control and execution or" current
fiscal year budgets. This would further allow NSF managers to
work with more valid historical data bases in estimating future
obligations, expenditures, and demand requirements. The end result
would be a more accurate forecast of NSF end-of-period cash
balances for out-year budgets.
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7. A central MSF system to control, monitor, and distribute locally
generated ADP casn management programs should be established .
Recent technological advances incorporating user friendly
programming techniques have enabled the development of programs
at the user level which facilitate and enhance stock fund
management. Certain of these local programs may enhance cash
management. One such program is RODMIS which was developed at
NSC San Diego
;
Ca., and resulted in a $5 million dollar reduction the
Material-in-Transit (over 180 days) account. Due to aggressive
management use of this program, credit was received from
providing activities for much of the material previously in that
account. These refunds were then used for additional purchases. A
centralized system or set of procedures which would enable
distribution of programs such as this to other potential users
would enhance and improve N5F cash management.
3. Cash management incentive systems within the N5F should o*
improved
. The current system of incentives does not positively
encourage NSF managers to pursue better cash management.
Examples of specific areas for improvement include: I ) incentives
to maximize the dollar value vice the number of discounts taken;
2) identification of appropriate measurement criteria for cash
management performance which reflects factors over which the
NSF managers actually have control, 3) decentralization of *i5?
cash in order to motivate NSF managers at all levels to better
manage "their" cash, to be responsible for cash at the lower levels,
and to encourage "bottom-up" forecasting of NSF cash.
9. Upward mobility at NSF activities for those in mid-level casn
management positions should be increased . Due to a shortage of
middle grade billets, the majority of employees are forced to
transfer to other jobs in order to advance further in grade. This
results in a serious loss of talent and corporate knowledge which
necessitates increased time and effort to train the newer entry
level replacements. The end result is a less effective cash
management effort due to this consistent personnel turnover.
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0. Efforts to reduce "human error" at all NSF levels should be
increased . "Human error" was identified as a significant problem at
every NSF activity visited by the authors. Uncorrected "entry"
errors could result in millions of dollars of NSF cash being
misstated or improperly accounted for. Correction of sucn
mistakes requires excessive time and effort. In order to minimize
such errors, improvements in the following areas should be
considered: 1 ) ensure only high quality personnel are performing the
cash management functions; 2) make individuals accountable for
their performance; 3) highly publicized rewards should be given for
error free work to encourage others to strive for the same quality
level of performance; and 4) an aggressive training program should
be pursued to insure that the requisite talent and corporate
knowledge base is maintained. Minimization of "human error" is
essential in order to "fine tune" NSF cash management.
Specific benefits to be realized from each of the above
recommendations are not easy to quantify. The costs, in some instances.
are readily available and identifiable. For others., they are more ooscj re
These uncertainties make any kind of cost-benefit analysis difficult :: r.
best. Further study may orovide better estimates of the feasibility 2r,c
costs associated with implementation of each recommendation
Some of the above recommendations, such as the ADP and forecasting
improvements, would be costly and time consuming to implement while
others, such as training efforts and incentive related issues, should cost
less. Note that the ADP upgrades are ongoing and the benefits realized
should outweigh the additional costs of initiating these recommendations.
The forecasting improvements are heavily dependent on these same ADP
systems and should reflect similar benefits.
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The complex nature of cash management within the Navy Stock Fund
makes it difficult to separate the various related factors which impact
the N5F cash levels. This thesis has attempted to identify those areas
which can be modified to improve the management and control of N5F
cash. The above recommendations would contribute to improving overall
N5F cash management operations. In addition, they would result in the
reduction of Federal borrowing and debt interest payments. If these
improvements are effectively instituted, all parties, including Treasury,
Navy, and the American taxpayers, will benefit from the actions taken.
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APPENDIX A
NSF FINANCIAL FORECASTING MODEL PREDICTION METHODOLOGY
Transaction or Account
1 ) Customer Orders
Description of Calculation
Standard : For each Budget Project, a total
fiscal year plan figure is stored in the
Parameter File for the current and
subsequent fiscal years. These figures are
broken down into monthly predictions using
seasonal factors also stored in the
Parameter File for each BP.
Individual Budaet Proiect predictions ara
then summed to proauce higner ievei
predictions, e.g., Total NSF, FMSO. Wholes^'
,
etc.
If the forecast is being made after the FY has
commenced, no compensation for the actual
rate of Orders to-date is made, i.e., i r" X
months remain in the FY, the total FY plan
figure is multiplied by X/ 1 2 and this amount
is spread over the remaining X months using
the X seasonal factors for these remaining
months, normalized so that their sum is one
Note: this will produce a cumulative total
FY Orders prediction which in most cases
will no_t exactly equal the FY plan figure.
Option *l: Compensates for actual Customer
Orders values for the current fiscal year
to-date, i.e., cumulative Orders to-date are
subtracted from the total current fiscal
year plan figure and the difference is then
spread over the remaining months of the FY
using seasonal factors. Note: this will
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produce a cumulative total FY Orders
prediction which will always equal the FY
plan figure.
Option *2: Overrides the application of
seasonal factors and accepts specific
monthly estimates for Orders in any or all
BP's for any or all months in the forecast
horizon. Any unspecified months are
calculated by the Standard method above,
after inserting the override values.
Option *5: Overrides the application of
seasonal factors and accepts specific
monthly estimates for Orders in any or al i
BP's. for any or all moonths in the forecast
horizon. Any unspecified months are
calculated by Option *] above, after
inserting the override values (i.e., in the
method of Options * 1 , the override values
are treated as if they were actuals).
2) Change in Unfilled
Customer Orders
Input directly for each month for each BP.
Higher level predictions are produces by




Calculated recursively for each BP from
current actual Unfilled Customer Orders and
monthly predictions of Changes in Unfilled
Customer Orders. Higher level predictions
are produced by summing individual Bucce 1;
Projects.
Calculated for each BP as predicted monthly
Customer Orders minus any predicted Change
in Unfilled Customer Orders for the month.
Higher level predictions are produced by
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summing individual Budget Projects. Note: a
positive Change in Unfilled Customer Orders
results in a smaller Sales figure for the
month.
5) Change in Accounts
Receivable
Input directly for each month, for the
Total NSF level only.
6) Accounts Receivable Calculated recursively at the Total MSFLevei
from current actual Accounts Receivable and




Input directly for each month for the Total
NSF level (Special Collections include
foreign military sales investments, advances
from 0&M,N, etc.).
Calculated at the Total NSF level as
predicted monthly Saled minus any predicted
Change in Accounts Receivable plus any
predicted Special Collections. Note: 3
positive Change in Accounts Receivable
results in a smaller Collections figure for
the month.
9) Obligations Standard: This method maintains the current
approved Orders/Obs Deviation as a fixed link
between forecasted total FY Customer Orders
and forecasted Total FY Obligations. For each
BP, the Orders/Obs Deviation (see next entry
in table) is then computed from plan data in
the Parameter File and subtracted from
forecasted Total FY Customer Orders (which
may or may not be equal to the Total FY
Customer Orders plan figure, depending on
which forecasting option was chosen for
Customer Orders). The result is forecasted
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Total FY Obligations for the current FY. Any
difference between this figure and the total
of cumulative actual obligations to-date and
remaining monthly obligation plan figures for
the FY is then distributed proportionately
across the remaining monthly obligation plan
figures. In the case of wholesale BP's 1
4
and 34, this distribution will affect only the
Replenishment plan figures. Monthly
predictions for any initial months of the
subsequent FY are taken directly from
monthly plan data. Higher level predictions
are produced by summing individual Budget
Projects.
Option f_L Monthly Obligation plan figures
stored in the Parameter File are used
directly for predicting all remaining months
of the current FY and any initial months of
the subsequent FY. Wholesale BP's 1 4 and 34
are broken by Provisioning and
Replenishment. Higher level predictions sr*
produced by summing individual Budget
Projects. Note: depending on which
forecasting option is used for Customer
Orders, this method will usually result in 3
new Deviation figure (see Orders/ Obs
Deviation below).
0) Orders/Obs Deviation Only applicable under the Total FY column at
the BP level. Will always appear as the
difference between forecasted Total FY
Customer Orders and forecasted Total FY
Obligations. Actual computation, however,
will vary with the forecasting option chosen
for Obligations. Under the Standard method,
the current approved Deviation is computed
as the difference between the Total FY
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1) Expenditures
Customer Orders plan figure and the sum of
FY Obligation monthly plan figures (both of
which are stored in the Parameter File), if
orders are larger, Deviation is positive; if
Obligations are larger, Deviation is negative.
Under Option * 1 , the Deviation is a forced
figure computed exactly as it appears, i.e.,
the difference between forecasted Total FY
Customer Orders and forecasted Total FY
Obligations.
Standard : Calculated for each BP by applying
monthly financial leadtime (FLT) distribution
weights (stored in the Parameter File) to
actual and/or predicted Obligations in the
current and prior months. Higher level
predictions are produced by summing
individual Budget Projects.
Option *1: Overrides the application of FLT
distribution methodology and accepts
specific monthly estimates for Expenditures
in any or all BP's, for any or all months in th<
forecast horizon. Any unspecified months




Calculated recursively for each BP from last-
month's actual or predicted Outstanding
Obligations plus predicted Obligations for
the current month, less predicted
Expenditures for the current month. Higher
level predictions are produced by summing
individual Budget Projects.
Input directly for each month for the BP and
Total NSF levels (e.g., transfers to/from
DLA). BP level inputs will be summed to the
60
Inventory Manager and the Wholesale/Retail
levels, but will not necessarily add to the
Total N5F level, since the figure at the Total
NSF level is in all cases a separate input
including amounts not identifiable to the BP
level.
4) Cash Impact Calculated only at the BP level as predicted
monthly Sales less predicted monthly
Expenditures plus any Cash Transfers.
5) Cash Balance Calculated at the Total NSF level as the
previous month's actual or predicted Cash
Balance plus predicted Collections for the
current month less predicted Expenditures
for the current month plus or minus any
predicted Cash Transfers for the current
month. When a sufficient number of
forecasts have been stored in the Predictions
File, upper and lower limits will be computed
for each Cash Balance prediction.
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APPENDIX B
NAVSUP FORECASTING MODEL OUTPUT & FORMULAS
* NSF FY 84 ACTUfiL
«H-HHHHW#* ***** ******* ******* ******* »*»*»* IIKIH imm **»**•
BP/flCCOUNT ORDERS SfiLES OBS CP C0MKI7 TARGET 0/0 DEV CASH BF OBS BF
**+**++***** *».**** ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* Ht.tH »****»*
BP 14: OPS 419.2 446.0 432.7 169.0 601.7 -13.5 -- 658.3
INV 29.9 29.9 -29.9 -*- 31.1
PUR 21.2 21.2 -21.2 -*- 1.4














*T0T 14.2 14.1 13.6 0.5 14.1 0.6 -*- 9.0
BP 21: TOT 906.6 906.6 931.3 30.0 961.3 -24.7 -*- 44.7
BP 23: TOT 9.7 9.7 161.9 25.0 186.9 -152.2 -*- 0.0
BP 25: TOT 2.3 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.2 -*- 1.0
BP 28: OPS 1393.9 1385.0 1480.2 139.0 1619.2 -66.3 -*- 214.9
INV 52.6 52.6 -52.6 -*- 0.0
PUR 45.6 45.8 -45.8 -*- 0.0
TOT 1393.9 1385.0 1578.6 139.0 1717.6 -184.7 -*- 214.9
BP 34: OPS 895.1 850.5 811.3 251.9 1063.2 83.8 -- 943.9
INV 136.7 136.7 -136.7 -»- 43.3
PUR 11.2 11.2 -11.2 -*- 19.0
TOT 895.1 350.5 959.2 251.9 1211.1 -64.1 -t~ 1006.2
BP 38: OPS 2183.6 2183.6 2213.2 449.8 2663.0 -29.6 -*- 136.9
INV 7.7 7.7 -7.7 -*-
PUR 0.0 0.0 -*-
TOT 2183.6 2183.6 2220.9 449.8 2670.
7
-37.3 -*- 136.9
BP 81: PRC 826.1 745.7 795.1 312.9 1108.0 31.0 -*- 1242.6
RUK 239.7 239.7 -239.
7
-*- 179.7
ST OPS -+- -*- 1034.8 -- 1347.7 -208. -*- 1422.3
INV 99.8 99.8 -99.8 -*- 61.3
PUR 48.9 48.9 -48.9 -*- 3.9









ST OPS -*- -+- 0.0 -*- 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0
INV 0.0 0.0 -*-
PUR 0.0 0.0 -*-
TOT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -+- 0.0
i iimii iiH mm ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* *******
NSF: fl/R -55.7
OPS 6650.7 6543.5 6839.4 1378.1 8217.5 -188.7 -*- 3251.3
RUK 0.0 0.0 239.7 0.0 239.7 -239.7 -*- 179.7
OPS 6650.7 6487.8 7079.1 1378.1 8457.2 -428.4 538.0 3431.0
INV 0.0 0.0 326.7 0.0 326.7 -326.7 0.0 135.7
PUR 0.0 0.0 127.1 0.0 127.1 -127.1 124.4 24.3










IGNORE FLTS, USED FOR COMPUTATION OF EXPENDITURES
23.3 332.2 -113.8 -*- -*- 733.8
-1.1 31.1 31.1 100.8 -*- - 29.9
17.8 1.0 1.0 2.2 -*- 21.6





» DBS CF INCLUDES $113.7 FOR LONG
LEAD TIME MATERIAL




1.2 333.0 -23.6 -*-
8.4 43.6 38.9 -
0.0 1.1 -1.2 -i-
1.9 1458.1 73.1 -*-
1.1 47.8 47.8 69.5
2.6 35.7 35.7 19.1
*- 1541.6 156.6 88.6
22.0 514.4 -336.1 --
12.0 43.3 43.3 186.0
22.5 10.1 10.1 11.2
567.8 -282.7 197.2
0.6 2244.7 61.1 -«-
7.7 7.7 7.7
0.0 0.0
•»- 2252.4 88.8 7.7
29.0 514.5 -231.2 -*-
11.0 199.7 199.7 -*-
*- 714.2 -31.5 -*-
12.0 61.3 61.3 226.5
13.1 2.5 2.5 9.9
*- 778.0 32.3 236.4
0.0 0.0 -i-
0.0 0.0 --
*- 0.0 0.0 -+-
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0




*- 6089.3 -534.2 -*-
199.7 199.7 -*-
*- 6209.0 -278.8 -*-
•*- 191.2 191.2 590.5
































IIH I II ******* **** *********
$135.7 OF $590.5 INV BUILD APPROPRIATION
IS EXPENDITURES BASED
BP 14 31. 1-
BP 34 *3.3
B3 81 61.3
$62.0 REFUNDED *Q G4MN REDUCES BP38
ORDERS AND SALES
APPROXIMATELY
4081.4 -- TO FY85
219.7 -4- 11 DAYS
4301.1 816.8 189.7
271.2 399.3 15 DAYS
102.1 117.5 258.7
$128. 1 INV AUG OBS CARRY FORWARD
-- 6449.! -38. 632.9 .0 4674.4 1333.6 * TOTAL UNDER SALES COLUMN REPRESENTS COLLECTIONS
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